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Introduction
IN THE YEARS SINCE WORLD WAR II, international judicial institu-
tions have been increasingly utilized to resolve a wide array of legal
disputes between nations.1 At least in part, this suggests recognition
that domestic legal systems may not always be suited to the task of
handling legal problems that have significant international ramifica-
tions. Moreover, while the process of creating international courts and
tribunals may be difficult and problematic, the frequent reliance on
such institutions demonstrates that nations often conclude that their
value is well worth the cost.
Perhaps the most logical environment for the use of international
judicial institutions is in the resolution of disputes under international
agreements. Specialized courts and tribunals focusing on specific trea-
ties or compacts have the ability to develop expertise in the agree-
ments they interpret, and are therefore likely to produce more
consistent and acceptable decisions. Reflecting this approach, the Eu-
ropean Union established the European Court of Justice to hear cases
raising issues under European Union law,2 and in a similar fashion,
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1. In particular, international judicial institutions have frequently been created to
resolve disputes arising under international trade agreements. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 19, pt. 7, Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289.
2. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 19, Feb. 7, 1992, 2010
O.J. (C 83) 13, 27.
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under the auspices of the United Nations, the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea was established to resolve disagreements arising
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.3
However, international judicial institutions that are not part of
any nation’s domestic legal system are increasingly being used to per-
form tasks beyond interpreting specialized treaties. In many circum-
stances, international tribunals have been established to resolve legal
disputes arising under general international law principles. This is il-
lustrated by the International Court of Justice, which was established
under the United Nations Charter to hear international legal disputes
submitted by national governments,4 and to render advisory opinions
on questions referred by organs of the United Nations, as well as spe-
cialized agencies authorized to request advisory opinions.5 In a com-
parable fashion, the International Court of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce acts as an umbrella organiza-
tion6 to promote and administer arbitration services for the resolution
of international business and commercial disputes.7
Separately, international judicial institutions are also being used
to interpret and protect human rights standards against infringement
by individuals and national governments. The European Court of
Human Rights (“ECHR”), which has responsibility for interpreting
and enforcing the European Convention on Human Rights (“Euro-
pean Convention”),8 is an important and influential illustration, but
other declarations of international human rights standards and mech-
anisms for their enforcement have also been created.9 International
3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 20–23, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, Annex VI.
4. Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 34–38, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
5. Id. at arts. 65–68.
6. As noted in the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, the Inter-
national Court of Arbitration “does not itself resolve disputes [but rather] administers the
resolution of disputes by arbitral tribunals.” International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitra-
tion and ADR Rules art. 1, § 2 (2011).
7. The website of the ICC International Court of Arbitration is located at http://
www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/organisation/dispute-resolution-services/icc-international-
court-of-arbitration/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2012). The International Chamber of Commerce
Arbitration Rules of the International Court of Arbitration can be found at http://www.icc
wbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Rules-of-arbitration/
Download-ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration-in-several-languages/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 25, 2012).
8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
32, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
9. The United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is illus-
trative. See United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
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human rights are also central concerns of the specialized War Crimes
Tribunals established by the United Nations to bring to justice those
responsible for atrocities in various war-torn regions, including the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
and Rwanda (“ICTR”).10 Looking to the future, and following many
years of effort, members of the international community voted to es-
tablish the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)—an international ju-
dicial institution for the prosecution of crimes offending international
human rights norms.11
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights]. Compliance with the terms of the Covenant is monitored by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee. Id. at art. 28. In the Western Hemisphere, the Organi-
zation of American States has adopted the American Convention on Human Rights. See
American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 [hereinafter Pact of San Jose]. Cases alleging violations of
the Convention are heard by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Id. at art. 33. See
also The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jun. 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
The treaty was adopted by the Organization of African Unity and is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Id. at art. 30.
10. Resolution 827, which was passed by the United Nations Security Council on May
25, 1993, established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 25, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute], adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993), 32 I.L.M. 1203. In 1994, the United Nations Security Council passed Reso-
lution 955, which created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter
ICTR Statute]. Special courts have also been established with United Nations involvement
to try human rights offenses committed in Lebanon, Cambodia and Sierra Leone. The
Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established under United Nations auspices to investigate
the events that lead to the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and
twenty-two others. See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Mar. 29, 2006, 2461
U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Lebanon Statute], adopted by S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc S/RES/
1757 (Mar. 29, 2006). A special tribunal, known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, was also established to deal with offenses committed during the Khmer
Rouge era in Cambodia. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, U.N. Doc. NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004). In addition, a Special
Court for Sierra Leone was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution
1315, August 14, 2000, to try serious human rights offenses committed in that country.
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Aug. 14, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinaf-
ter SCSL Statute], adopted by S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
11. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Annex II, Jul. 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. The ICC Statute was adopted on July 17, 1998
in Rome after an affirmative vote of 120 nations, and later came into force on July 1, 2002
following ratification by 60 countries. The United States is not a signatory of the ICC Stat-
ute. The negotiating process leading to the adoption of the ICC Statute is described in
Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L
L. 22, 22–24 (1999).
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The War Crimes Tribunals and the ICC, however, are set apart
from other international judicial entities. First, they do not address
disputes between national governments or parties to commercial ven-
tures. Beyond that, whereas the ECHR and other similar international
courts act to review compliance by member nations with recognized
human rights norms contained in the treaties that established the
courts,12 the War Crimes Tribunals and the ICC are courts of the first
instance that try individuals accused of applicable human rights of-
fenses in much the same way that national governments enforce their
own criminal laws.13
In serving as international courts that try what are essentially
criminal offenses, the War Crimes Tribunals and the ICC, like na-
tional criminal courts, have the responsibility to carefully balance the
institutional goal of successfully prosecuting human rights offenders
with the need to respect appropriate limits on the exercise of their
enforcement authority. The fact that the governments responsible for
the international criminal courts may have balanced these conflicting
interests differently in their domestic legal systems adds a further com-
plication to the process.
One area where the War Crimes Tribunals and the ICC have had
to balance enforcement needs, human rights standards, and variations
in the criminal procedure systems of member states is in the adminis-
tration of the right to remain silent. This doctrine, which is based on
the nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare principle that no one may be com-
pelled to incriminate himself,14 provides for a broad-based privilege to
withhold information. It is frequently incorporated in human rights
12. Article 1 of the European Convention describes the obligation of the “High Con-
tracting Parties [to] secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms”
defined in section I of the Convention, while Article 19 establishes the ECHR to “ensure
the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties.” Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 1, 19.
13. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 1 (“The International Tribunal shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanita-
rian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with
the provisions of the present Statute.”); ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 1 (stating that
the ICC “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern” as covered by the Statute).
14. For general background on the right to silence, see MARK BERGER, TAKING THE
FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1980) [herein-
after TAKING THE FIFTH]; R. H. HELMHOLZ, CHARLES M. GRAY, JOHN H. LANGBEIN, EBEN
MOGLEN & HENRY E. SMITH, THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT (1997); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968). Abe
Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 J. CLEV. BAR ASS’N 91 (1954).
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declarations,15 as well as in the constitutions and laws of many coun-
tries.16 Even the European Convention on Human Rights, which does
not include specific mention of a self-incrimination privilege, has
been interpreted by the ECHR to include right to silence protec-
tion.17 However, there are many variations in the formulation and
scope of the right, which in turn can have significantly different prac-
tical consequences on how criminal justice is administered.
This article will examine how the right to silence has been incor-
porated in various international human rights declarations during the
twentieth century. It will focus on the protection of the privilege of
silence in the proceedings of the recently created international tribu-
nals in The Hague that are trying individual offenders charged with
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The analysis will include con-
sideration of how these tribunals have applied right to silence doc-
trine in the wide variety of settings in which it is implicated. The War
Crimes Tribunals and the ICC have adhered to the international con-
sensus on the importance of protecting the right to a fair trial, includ-
ing respecting the role that the privilege of silence plays in the
criminal procedure process, and in so doing have ensured the legiti-
macy of its ultimate judgments.18
15. See, e.g., Pact of San Jose, supra note 9, at art. 8(2)(g) (“[E]very person is entitled,
with full equality . . . [to] the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to
plead guilty.”); United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 9, at art. 14(3)(g) (“[E]veryone shall be entitled . . . [n]ot to be compelled to testify
against himself or to confess guilt.”).
16. E.g., INDIA CONST. art. 20, § 3 (protecting a person accused of any offense against
being compelled to be a witness against himself); Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, § 11(c) (individuals “charged with an offense”
may not be “compelled to be a witness in proceedings . . . in respect of the offense”); New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 No. 109, § 25(d) (individuals charged with an offense are
granted the right not to be compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt).
17. This has been the result of the Court’s broad reading of the right to a “fair and
public hearing” contained in Article 6(1) of the Convention. Mark Berger, Europeanizing
Self-Incrimination: the Right to Remain Silent in the European Court of Human Rights, 12 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 339, 341 (2006) [hereinafter Europeanizing Self-Incrimination].
18. Cristian DeFrancia, Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Mat-
ters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1436–37 (2001) (“[T]he sui generis character of [the tribunals’]
proceedings allows for the development of robust protections for the rights of the accused
[and that] it is better for the credibility of a budding international criminal common law to
err on the side of stronger protections rather than weaker.”); Sara Anoushirvani, Com-
ment, The Future of the International Criminal Court: The Long Road to Legitimacy Begins With
The Trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 213, 215 (2010) (“[Because of the]
Tribunal’s insistence upon upholding the principle of a defendant’s right to a fair trial [in
the “Lubanga” case] . . . the ICC has taken one step forward in establishing itself as a
legitimate judicial institution.”).
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I. Background to International Criminal Law Enforcement
The creation of a system of criminal law that includes not only
the definition of prohibited acts, but also provides for a process to
identify, prosecute, and punish violators, is a core responsibility of any
government. Nations are expected to legislate basic standards of be-
havior that protect persons and property against unwarranted inter-
ference, and to enforce those standards by apprehending violators,
adjudicating their responsibility, and applying appropriate sanctions
for the offenses they commit. However, domestic criminal law en-
forcement may not be effective when the offenses involve serious in-
ternational human rights abuses.
Particularly where human rights standards are breached during
wartime or civil disturbance, reliance upon domestic investigations
and prosecutions can be uniquely problematic. In such cases there is
no guarantee that an appropriate law enforcement response will be
forthcoming. The problem is especially acute when national govern-
ments and their leaders are the responsible parties. Where that is true,
the only possibility for a law enforcement response is through external
intervention. However, the kind of cooperation among governments
that is necessary to perform this task has been consistently difficult to
achieve, except following armed conflicts where the victors have cho-
sen to bring the vanquished to trial for the latter’s conduct during the
conflict, or where governments have selectively prosecuted their own
personnel for extreme misconduct.19
The difficulty of prosecuting crimes connected with war-related
human rights abuses, and the general pattern of limiting any such
effort to participants on the losing side of the conflict, is illustrated by
the unsuccessful Allied attempt after World War I to bring charges
against Kaiser Wilhelm II for waging war.20 Initially, efforts were made
19. One commentator observed that war crime prosecutions by national courts “were
and remain ineffective when those responsible for the crimes are still in power and their
victims remain subjugated. Historically, the prosecution of war crimes was generally re-
stricted to the vanquished or to isolated cases of rogue combatants in the victor’s army.”
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1 (4th ed.
2011) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT].
20. The Kaiser would have been tried for “a supreme offence against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties.” Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles),
art. 227, Jun. 28, 1919, 3 U.S.T. 1329 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles]. Violations of the
laws and customs of war by German military personnel were to be prosecuted pursuant to
Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles, id. at arts. 228, 229, and suggestions were
made that prosecutions of Turkish officials for the slaughter of Armenians should be un-
dertaken. However, the tribunal to try Germans was never established and political consid-
erations following the 1917 Russian Revolution put an end to any thought of Turkish
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to begin the process by securing custody of the former German
leader, but this was thwarted by his successful escape to the Nether-
lands where he was given refuge and allowed to live out his life.21
Thereafter, the desire to prosecute the Kaiser waned, partly due to the
passage of time, and partly out of concern for the stability of the Wei-
mar government.22 The goal of providing an international forum to
try the Kaiser in the end was not achieved.
In contrast, the World War II Allies obtained custody of a number
of German and Japanese war leaders and were able to bring them to
trial for the human rights atrocities committed by their armed forces.
While the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals23 represent
milestones in the internationalization of human rights standards and
their enforcement through international mechanisms, both have
been subject to criticism as more representative of victors’ justice than
illustrations of fair and objective adjudications of the violation of in-
ternational norms of behavior.24
prosecutions. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
395–99 (2003) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW]; see also
Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I
Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 221, 278–90
(1989) (describing additional political considerations leading to the suspension of Turkish
prosecutions); Vincent M. Creta, Comment, The Search for Justice in the Former Yugoslavia and
Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 381,
385–86 (1998) (explaining that an international criminal tribunal was never created after
World War I due partially to concerns of possible German resistance).
21. The Allies did not request extradition of the Kaiser from the Netherlands, whose
monarch, Queen Wilhelmina, was his cousin. In formal terms, the Netherlands position
was that the offense charged against the Kaiser for his decision to go to war was unknown
to Dutch law and therefore not subject to extradition. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at 400 & n.32; THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra
note 19, at 3.
22. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at 401.
23. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was created by the four victori-
ous Allied powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. It was
established pursuant to a charter contained in the London Agreement of August 8, 1945.
See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter]. The
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in contrast, was established pursuant to an
order promulgated by General Douglas MacArthur in his capacity as Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(1946), reprinted in U.S. Dep’t of State, Trial of Japanese War Criminals 39–44 (Pub. No.
2613, Far Eastern Series No. 12, 1946), 4 Bevans 20, 21–22 [hereinafter IMTFE Charter];
see generally INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at 405–26.
24. The Tokyo Tribunal procedures, in particular, were the subject of widespread crit-
icism. See INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at 416–18. Justice
Murphy objected to the proceedings that resulted in the conviction of Japanese General
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In both the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings, the defendants
were tried for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity25 before military tribunals rather than civilian courts. In
each case, the governing charters provided that the tribunals would
not be bound by technical rules of evidence, but rather were to “admit
any evidence which [the tribunal] deem[ed] to have probative
value.”26 The Nuremberg Tribunal specifically held that this included
the admission of voluntary pretrial statements of an accused, even
though defendants could not be called to testify against their will.27
The tribunals employed adjudicatory rules that were a mixture of the
features of adversarial systems, where the parties retain primary con-
trol of the proceedings, and civil law systems in which the judge plays
a more activist role.28 In the end, the Nuremberg and Tokyo War
Crimes Tribunal cases and the domestic prosecutions that followed29
Yamashita, describing his trial as the “uncurbed spirit of revenge and retribution, masked
in formal legal procedure.” In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
25. IMT Charter, supra note 23, at art. 6; IMTFE Charter, supra note 23, at art. 5;
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at 408.
26. IMT Charter, supra note 23, at art. 19; IMTFE Charter, supra note 23, at art. 13.
Both Tribunals focused on the prosecution of higher-level policymakers, and therefore the
evidence relied on by the prosecution was more likely to be documentary as opposed to
testimonial. In contrast, the criminal tribunals established since 1990 have involved more
frequent prosecutions of individuals directly responsible for the commission of atrocities.
As a result, more reliance in these prosecutions has been placed on witness testimony.
Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo,
The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 725, 743–44 (1999) [hereinafter Trends
in International Criminal Evidence].
27. Trends in International Criminal Evidence, supra note 26, at 761–62; see also United
States v. Wilhelm von Leeb (High Command), 15 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nu-
ernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, at 877 (1948) (upholding
the admission of statements obtained without duress or promises of immunity). In con-
trast, statements obtained under duress were subject to exclusion. United States v. Ulrich
Greifelt, (Ru SHA Case)—Statement from the Judgment of the Tribunal Concerning the
Exclusion of Affidavits of Witnesses who Testified that They Had Executed the Affidavits
Under Threats and Duress, 15 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, at 879 (1948).
28. See generally INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW supra note 20, at
407–08 (noting some input from the criminal justice system of the Soviet Union in the
Nuremberg Tribunal procedures); Kai Ambos, The Structure of International Criminal Proce-
dure: ‘Adversarial’, ‘Inquisitorial’ or Mixed?, in GLOBALIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 461–503
(Michael Bohlander ed., 2010) (noting ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ elements of the law
of the ICTY and the ICC).
29. Under the authority of the Allied Control Council in Germany, war crime prose-
cutions of lower ranking officials were undertaken in each of the four Allied zones, with
evidence admissibility standards similar to those that governed the Nuremberg Tribunal.
In Japan, the Yokohama trials followed the Tokyo Tribunal proceedings with procedural
and evidentiary rules based upon the Nuremberg and Allied Control Counsel system. See
Trends in International Criminal Evidence, supra note 26, at 732.
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resulted in convictions that reflected the international community’s
condemnation of war-related atrocities. As such, they were an impor-
tant first step in ending the legal impunity that war leaders who com-
mit gross violations of human rights had come to rely upon.
Despite the revelations of the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crime
Tribunals, genocide, murder, sexual assaults, and other human rights
offenses committed on a vast and coordinated scale have not disap-
peared. In the latter part of the twentieth century, the world has seen
human rights outrages in such places as Cambodia under the Khmer
Rouge, Rwanda during the ethnic war between the Hutus and Tutsies,
and the former Yugoslavia as the country separated into historically
hostile enclaves. The scale of the horror during these episodes may
not have reached the total kill count of the Nazis, but the brutality was
equivalent.30
Although, over the years, proposals for a permanent institution to
oversee the prosecution of such human rights offenses had been
made,31 none had borne fruit by the time that the Yugoslav, Rwandan,
and Cambodian horrors occurred. As a result, any response from the
international community would have had to take the form of an ad
hoc mechanism, much like the response of the Allies following World
War II. The challenge was taken up by the United Nations, and the
response agreed upon was the creation of special tribunals to investi-
gate and prosecute responsible offenders. Most notable among them
have been the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (“ICTY”)32 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”).33 Special tribunals were also established to deal with human
30. The human rights violations in Cambodia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia
have been well documented. See, e.g., Statement of the Co-Prosecutors, Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Jul. 18, 2007), available at http://www.yale.edu/
cgp/downloads/Statement_of_Co-Prosecutors18-July-2007.pdf; U.N. Secretary-General, Re-
port of the Secretary General on Human Rights Question: Human Rights Situations and Reports of
Special Rapporteurs and Representatives, U.N. Doc. A/49/508/Add.1 (Nov. 14, 1994); U.N.
Secretary-General, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994).
31. See Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Ap-
praisal, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 665, 669–85 (1996).
32. The ICTY was established following the adoption of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 827 in 1993. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). It
was the first of the Security Council’s special criminal tribunals. The ICTY website, which
contains helpful links to the Tribunal’s statute, rules and case law, is located at http://
www.icty.org/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
33. The creation of the ICTR was also the result of the adoption of a resolution by the
United Nations Security Council. See S.C. Res 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
The ICTR website is located at: http://www.ictr.org/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
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rights violations in Cambodia,34 Sierra Leone,35 and to investigate and
prosecute those responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.36 However, because of its significantly
higher profile, the ICTY will be the focus of the War Crimes Tribunal
discussion, which follows.37
The statutes creating both the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals fo-
cus on serious human rights violations that took place within defined
jurisdictional and temporal limits.38 They establish personal responsi-
bility for individuals who committed or planned the violations,39 and
have demonstrated that “international investigations and prosecutions
of persons responsible for serious violations of international humani-
tarian law are possible and credible.”40 However, while the tribunals
cover such crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws
or customs of war,41 they were established as ad hoc United Nations
institutions and, as such, required agreement among the members of
the United Nations Security Council to pass the implementing
resolutions.
An obvious alternative to that approach is the creation of a per-
manent mechanism, not tied to any particular event, that would be
able to respond to international human rights atrocities as they arise.
Many have called for such a solution over the years.42 And although
34. See supra note 10.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The ICTY came into existence before the other War Crimes Tribunals and has
prosecuted defendants who are better known in Europe and North America, including the
former Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milos˘evic´. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milos˘evic´,
Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment, ¶¶ 90–100 (May 22, 1999). Moreover, ICTY proceedings
are conducted in The Hague, while the other tribunals conduct their proceedings outside
of Europe.
38. In the case of the ICTY, jurisdiction is limited to the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia, and the temporal starting point is 1991. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 1. The
Rwanda Statute defines its geographical reach as Rwanda, along with neighboring states in
the case of violations committed by Rwandan citizens, and establishes a temporal limitation
of January 1 to December 31, 1994. ICTR Statute, supra note 10, at art. 1.
39. ICTR Statute, supra note 10, at art. 6; ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 7. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzˇic´ & Ratko Mladic´, Nos. IT-95-5-R61 & IT-95-18-R61, Review
of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 81–85
(Jul. 11, 1996) (identification of the bases of individual responsibility of the defendants).
40. Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 463 (1998).
41. ICTR Statute, supra note 10, at arts. 2–4; ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at arts. 2–5.
Violation of the laws of war are not part of the ICTR statute due to the absence of an
armed conflict as was present during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.
42. Wexler, supra note 31, at 669–85.
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the process was long and tedious, in the end, sufficient support was
secured for the adoption of the Rome Statute, creating the ICC as a
permanent institution where serious and widespread human rights
atrocities could be referred.43 Currently, 120 states, not including the
United States,44 have become members of the court.45
This time, the U.N. Security Council was not the source of au-
thority for the institution’s creation and therefore global jurisdiction
for the ICC was not achieved. Instead, the court was established by
treaty,46 thereby limiting the extent that nationals of non-signatories
could be made subject to the court’s reach.47 Additionally, the court’s
43. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 1. The ICC Statute was approved by participat-
ing states on a vote of 120 in favor and 7 against, with 21 abstentions. See Press Release,
U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent
International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release L/2889 (Jul. 20, 1998).
44. The United States publicly indicated that it was voting against the establishment of
the Court. The vote was unrecorded, but one author has speculated that other opponents
of the ICC Statute were China, India, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen. Leila Nadya
Sadat, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 384 n.8
(2000). The American concern was that, by granting automatic jurisdiction to the state in
which the offense was committed, United States nationals serving in the military overseas
would be subject to prosecution by the ICC, even if the United States did not agree to the
treaty and objected to the prosecution. A compromise acceptable to the United States on
this issue could not be reached. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 26 (1999). After not signing the treaty in Rome, the
Bush Administration informed the United Nations that it did not intend to become part of
the Court. Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court
Treaty, AM. SOC. OF INT’L L. INSIGHTS, May 2002, available at http://www.asil.org/insigh87.
cfm. Articles agreeing and disagreeing with the United States’ position regarding the ICC,
respectively, include Cara Levy Rodriguez, Slaying the Monster: Why the United States Should
Not Support the Rome Treaty, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 805 (1999) and Patricia M. Wald, Why I
Support the International Criminal Court, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 513 (2003).
45. See ICC–The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/
ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
46. One author described this as a “practical decision” with resulting “financing, bu-
reaucratic structure, authority, and power” implications. Sadat, supra note 44, at 395.
47. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 8 (2003). The ICC lacks the foundation of a
Security Council resolution, which would result in “a mandatory obligation for States to
cooperate.” Id. at 7. However, the Security Council may refer cases for investigation involv-
ing nationals of non-signatory states to the ICC, pursuant to Article 13(b) of the ICC Stat-
ute. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 13(b). This occurred with respect to genocide
charges filed against President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan. See ICC Prosecutor Seeks
Charges Against Sudanese President for Darfur Crimes, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Jul. 14, 2008), http:/
/www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27361&Cr=Darfur&Cr1=&Kw1=al%2DBashir
&Kw2=&Kw3=. It also occurred with respect to Muammar Al-Qadhafi and one of his sons,
both indicted for crimes against humanity upon referral by the Security Council. See ICC
Issues Arrest Warrants for Libyan Officials for Alleged Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. NEWS CEN-
TRE (Jun. 27, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38855&Cr=Libya&
Cr1=.
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prosecutor was given circumscribed authority to initiate investigations,
in contrast to the unrestricted authority bestowed on prosecutors of
the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals to investigate offenses covered by
each statute.48 Nevertheless, the final structure established under the
ICC Statute remained sufficiently controversial that the United States
and a number of other nations opted not to sign on.49
Identifying the offenses that the international criminal tribunals
would prosecute50 represented only one part of the human rights
agenda that needed to be addressed. In addition, and despite the ex-
tent and brutality of the atrocities the War Crimes Tribunals and the
ICC would have to confront, each of the institutions also faced the
need to create a process that would respect the defense rights of those
called to account for their conduct. Indeed, as one commentator per-
suasively argued,
48. While ICTY Statute Article 18 authorizes the prosecutor to initiate an investigation
on his own authority, continuing onto a formal charge and trial requires a confirmed in-
dictment by the Trial Chamber under ICTY Statute Article 19. ICTY Statute, supra note 10,
at art. 18. The same procedure is required by ICTR Statute Articles 17 and 18(1). ICTR
Statute, supra note 10, at arts. 17, 18(1). In contrast, ICC Statute Article 15(4) calls for the
Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to determine whether “there is a reasonable basis to proceed
with an investigation . . . [in which case it] shall authorize the commencement of the
investigation.” ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 15(4). Additionally, the “complementary”
jurisdiction of the ICC can only be exercised if specific conditions are met. Id. at art. 1.
These include the unwillingness or inability of a state to carry out an investigation or prose-
cute following an investigation. Id. at art. 17(1)(a)–(b). In contrast, the jurisdiction to
pursue covered offenses is primary under the ICTY Statute, ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at
art. 9, and the ICTR Statute, ICTR Statute, supra note 10, at art. 8.
49. See supra note 44.
50. Article 1 of the ICC Statute establishes ICC jurisdiction “over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern.” ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 1. These are
specified in Article 5(1)(a)–(d) of the ICC Statute which lists four specific offenses as fall-
ing within the jurisdiction of the ICC. They are genocide, defined in Article 6, crimes
against humanity, defined in Article 7, and war crimes, defined in Article 8. Id. at arts. 6–8.
Article 5 also identifies the crime of aggression, but the exercise of jurisdiction over aggres-
sion is subject to the qualification under Article 5(2) that a definition of the offense and
conditions for enforcement be developed pursuant to Articles 121 and 123, and the re-
quirement that the treatment of aggression be consistent with the United Nations Charter.
Id. at arts. 5, 121, 123. Issues related to the interpretation of the definitions of the covered
offenses are described in Leila Nadya Sadat, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 421–38 (2000). The jurisdiction of the ICTY is limited to grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 2, violations
of the laws or customs of war, id. at art. 3, genocide, id. at art. 4, and crimes against human-
ity, id. at art. 5, where the offenses involve “serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia” after 1991, id. at art. 1. The ICTR
Statute confers jurisdiction over “serious violations” committed in Rwanda or by Rwandan
citizens in neighboring states between January 1 and December 31, 1994, ICTR Statute,
supra note 10, at art. 1, that involve genocide, id. at art. 2, crimes against humanity, id. at
art. 3, and Geneva Conventions offenses, id. at art. 4.
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[I]t is precisely at those times when moral outrage is at its highest
that the burden on adjudicating bodies is heaviest both to satisfy
society’s collective need for condemnation and punishment of war
criminals and simultaneously to assiduously protect the rights of
those accused of war crimes. In order for a war crimes tribunal to
possess legitimacy, it must ensure that rights of the accused are
protected by the principles of due process and fundamental
fairness.51
The model of the Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals would
not have been an appropriate choice given their distance from con-
temporary views of fair procedure in the administration of criminal
justice.52 Instead, the authorizing statutes of the War Crimes Tribunals
and the ICC, along with subsequently issued rules, had to create a
system that would present the world with a credible institutional
framework for adjudicating responsibility. This inevitably meant being
attentive to the dual objectives of efficiently bringing to justice those
responsible for modern day mass atrocities, while at the same time
“fully respect[ing] internationally recognized standards regarding the
rights of the accused at all stages” of the enforcement process.53
Deciding whether to provide War Crimes Tribunal and ICC de-
fendants with a right to silence, and determining what scope such a
right would have, was one of the considerations faced by those who
drafted the international court’s statutes and rules. Arguments in sup-
port of the right to silence itself have been subject to criticism over the
years as failing to justify a doctrine that thwarts the truth-seeking func-
tion of the adjudication process by removing potentially probative evi-
51. Lynne Miriam Baum, Pursuing Justice in a Climate of Moral Outrage: An Evaluation of
the Rights of the Accused in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J.
197, 197 (2001). Another commentator has observed that if “international judges are to be
successful in delivering their moral messages, they must be trusted by their audiences as
legitimate authority and be perceived by them as fair.” Mirjan Damas˘ka, The Competing
Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International Criminal Tribunals, 36 N. C. J. INT’L &
COM. REG. 365, 378 (2011).
52. KARIN N. CALVO-GOLLER, THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: ICTY AND ICTR PRECEDENTS 16 (2006) (“The approaches taken to evidentiary and
procedural matters at the post-World War II trials would, in view of the development of
international human rights law, be unacceptable at present.”).
53. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Se-
curity Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶ 106, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). In the words
of one commentator, it is “extremely unlikely that the international community, believing
in the importance of the rule of law, would accept an institution that would allow unfair
trials to proceed.” Anoushirvani, supra note 18, at 227. But it has also been suggested that
“some departures by international criminal tribunals from domestic standards of fairness
can be justified, given their sui generis goals, the complexity and atrocity of crimes they
process, and the innate weaknesses of these tribunals.” Damas˘ka, supra note 51, at 380.
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dence from the fact-finder’s consideration.54 Moreover, conduct that
compels incriminating evidence from an accused may well violate
other international human rights standards, thereby obviating the
need for a particularized right to silence in such instances.55 Never-
theless a clear international consensus has emerged that the right to
silence is an essential component of any system that is designed to
enforce criminal law standards.56
However, that there is widespread agreement that the right to
silence must be incorporated as part of an international tribunal’s de-
lineation of defense rights does not answer the question of how far
the right to silence must extend. Nevertheless, up until the framing of
the statutes and rules of the War Crimes Tribunals, there had been
only limited development of the concept by international institutions.
The one major exception was the ECHR, which constructed a broad
right to silence doctrine despite the fact that the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, the treaty the ECHR interprets, does not in-
54. E.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, A RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, in 7 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 446 (Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) (1838–1843) (arguing that
there is a connection between “delinquency on the one hand, and silence under inquiry
on the other . . . .”). The more recent debate in Great Britain leading to the enactment of
legislation permitting adverse inferences from silence was initiated by a report of the Crim-
inal Law Revision Commission in 1972, which expressed concern that the right to silence
deprived fact-finders of probative evidence and enabled the guilty to hide from justice.
Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report, Evidence (General) ¶ 30, 1972
Cmnd. 4991; Mark Berger, Reforming Confession Law British Style: A Decade of Experience with
Adverse Inferences From Silence, 31 COLUMBIA COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 243, 250–253 (2000)
[hereinafter Reforming Confession Law British Style]; see also, e.g., C. Theophilopoulos, The So-
Called ‘Right’ to Silence and the ‘Privilege’ Against Self-Incrimination: A Constitutional Principal in
Search of Cogent Reasons, 18 SAJHR 505, 528 (2002) (“Criticism of the right arouses a bar-
rage of emotional defences often approaching near religious adulation. Yet in terms of
utility, a protection against self-incrimination excludes the best kind of evidence increasing
the risk of vexation, delay, and expense.”).
55. As an illustration, the use of force to extract an admission would be covered by the
U.N Covenant provision barring “torture . . . [and] cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.” United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 9, at art. 7. A comparable provision barring “torture [and] . . . inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment” is part of the European Human Rights Convention.
European Convention, supra note 8, at art. 3. This provision was the basis of an ECHR
decision which held that police threats of inhumane treatment designed to force a suspect
to reveal the location of a kidnapping victim violated Article 3 of the of the Convention.
Ga¨fgen v. Germany, App. No. 22978/05, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 13, ¶¶ 98–99 (2008). In Ameri-
can law, involuntary confessions were measured against the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prior to the Supreme Court’s application of the Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination privilege as the standard for assessing confession admissibility. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506–14 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally MARK BERGER,
TAKING THE FIFTH, supra note 14, at 99–124 (describing the United States Supreme Court’s
“Road to Miranda.”).
56. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
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clude any specific reference to a right to silence or privilege against
self-incrimination.57 Functioning in the manner of an appellate court,
the ECHR’s right to silence decisions have proven to be particularly
influential in the development of self-incrimination principles by the
War Crimes Tribunals and ICC.58
II. The Right to Silence in the ICTY
A. Core Protection: Defendant Statements
The drafters of the statute governing the ICTY, the first of the
post-Nuremberg/Tokyo international criminal tribunals, were faced
with the enormously complex task of constructing a legal system to
identify, investigate, and try suspects accused of human rights atroci-
ties. Surrounding their efforts was skeptiscism that the war crimes of-
fenders would ever be brought to justice,59 as well as wariness as to
whether the ICTY proceedings could be conducted in a fair and im-
partial manner.60 Superimposed on these difficulties was the equally
57. The European Convention’s incorporation of a right to a “fair and public hear-
ing” in Article 6(1) was relied upon by the ECHR as the source of authority for its rulings
that member states must respect the right to silence as defined in the Court’s jurispru-
dence. E.g., Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, ¶ 68
(1996),; Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18731/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, ¶ 45
(1996); Funke v. France, App. No. 10828/84, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297, ¶ 44 (1993). The
Saunders decision also referenced the presumption of innocence protected by Article 6(2)
of the Convention in support of its ruling. Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/
91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, ¶ 68 (1996). See generally Europeanizing Self-Incrimination, supra
note 17, at 342–346.
58. Although the jurisdiction of the ECHR is limited to member states, its rulings
have had a wider significance. One commentator has observed that the ECHR “system of
human rights protection enjoys an element of ‘universality-legitimacy’ in the dissemination
of its judicial practice across various legal and judicial systems worldwide.” Nicolas A. J.
Croquet, The International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Defence Rights: A Mirror of the
European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence?, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 91, 123 (2011). Con-
tributing to this result is the direction contained in Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute that its
provisions be interpreted in a manner that is “consistent with internationally recognized
human rights,” a requirement, however, that is not contained in the ICTY’s governing
statute. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 21(3). ECHR rulings have also had a substantial
impact on the domestic law of signatories to the European Convention. See Georg Rees,
The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Domestic Legal
Order, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 359 (2005).
59. It has been observed that since the Nuremberg trials following World War II, “gov-
ernments have for the most part regressed to the convenient practices of realpolitik,
whereby accountability and justice are bargained-for political compromises” as a result of
which “instead of being held accountable for . . . international crimes, most of the perpe-
trators have benefited from impunity either de facto or de jure.” INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW supra note 20, at 496.
60. Michail Wladimiroff, defense attorney for Dus˘ko Tadic, the first defendant
brought to trial by the ICTY, raised concerns as to whether the difficulties of building a
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serious problem of trying to reconcile the civil and common law sys-
tems that were represented among the ICTY Statute’s drafters.
In the end, the ICTY Statute finally agreed upon attempted to
balance these opposing interests. It created a mechanism to bring
human rights offenders from the former Yugoslavia to justice, but in a
manner that was responsive to contemporary views of fair procedure.
Differences between representatives from common law and civil law
countries were accommodated in the procedural structure of the Stat-
ute and subsequently-framed Rules, just as they were later accommo-
dated in the statute creating the ICC.61 The ICTY Statute creates a
system where the case’s presentation is placed primarily in the hands
of the parties,62 but with a more involved judiciary than is customary
in common law courts. In this way, concepts from both the accusato-
rial system, which is more passive, and the inquisitorial system, which
is more active,63 were combined.64 Initially, the post World War II ad
defense case would prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial. James Podgers, The
World Cries for Justice, 82 A.B.A. J. 52, 60 (1996). See generally Vincent M. Creta, The Search for
Justice in the Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused under the Statute
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 381 (1998).
61. The approach to the admission of evidence in the ICTY structure has been de-
scribed as “a very liberal one, paralleling that of civil law systems” but this “has been
merged with a common law-derived adversarial framework.” Sara Luzzati, On the Admissibil-
ity of Statements Made by the Defendant Prior to Trial, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 221, 222 (2010).
Similarly, it has been noted that, in describing the duties and powers of the prosecutor in
ICC investigations, the relevant provision, Article 54, “attempts to build a bridge between
the adversarial common law approach to the role of the Prosecutor and the role of the
investigating judge in certain civil law systems.” COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1078 (Otto Triffterer, ed., 2008).
62. One ICTY Trial Chamber observed, “[w]hile the procedure and evidentiary sys-
tem of this Tribunal represents an attempt to blend elements of both civil and adversarial
systems, it remains primarily adversarial. Hence, in contrast to the position normally found
in a civil system, it is the parties who, in turn, call and question ‘their’ respective witnesses
. . . .” Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motions to
Admit Prior Statements as Substantive Evidence, ¶ 8 (Apr. 25, 2005).
63. CALVO-GOLLER, supra note 52, at 142 (“The most striking difference between the
basic assumptions behind the two legal systems might be described as an active approach
on the part of the court in the inquisitorial legal tradition, as opposed to a somewhat
passive approach which is taken by the courts in the legal tradition of the common law.”).
64. With respect to the ICTY, it has been noted that its earlier structure “enshrine[d]
a basically adversarial approach, in which the procedure is ‘advocate-led’, rather than an
inquisitorial approach, in which the procedure is ‘judge-led.’” JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 163
(2d ed. 2000). However, over time, and due to the presence of numerous judges from civil
law countries, more inquisitorial features have been added to the international court’s
procedures. Interview of Jean-Claude Antonetti, Judge, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugo., in The Hague, Netherlands (May 31, 2011). What has emerged is a legal struc-
ture that reflects the “[c]onscious efforts [that were] made to harmonize the general
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hoc Tribunals borrowed most of their procedures from common law
systems, whereas the ICC Statute was drafted with broader jurisdic-
tional representation.65 However, over time, even the ICTY system has
been “moving more in the direction of the civil law approach.”66
Adjudicatory procedures were an important focus of the drafters
of the ICTY Statute, and an effort was made to make certain that the
structure they created would ensure fair treatment for defendants fac-
ing trial. Article 21, entitled “Rights of the accused,”67 reflects part of
the effort to achieve that objective. It mandates a “fair and public
hearing”68 and that the accused be “presumed innocent until proved
guilty.”69 Additionally, it provides the defendant with such standard
due process protections as the right to be informed of the charges, to
choose and communicate with counsel, to have counsel appointed
without cost if required by the interests of justice, to be tried without
undue delay, to examine opposing witnesses, and to secure the attend-
ance of witnesses for their defense.70 Article 21 also includes a specific
right to silence protection through language providing that the ac-
cused has the right “not to be compelled to testify against himself or
to confess guilt.”71 The same substantive protection was later included
in the Rwanda and Lebanon Tribunals’ authorizing statutes.72
principles of criminal law and rules of procedure of the common law and civil law systems
. . . . As a result, the provisions dealing with general principles and procedural issues are a
hybrid of the common and the civil law.” Arsanjani, supra note 44, at 25. However, one
commentator maintains that the final blended product reflects “a largely adversarial ap-
proach” to the procedural issues involved in performing the tribunals’ functions. Steafan
Kirsch, The Trial Proceedings Before the ICC, in GLOBALIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 542
(Michael Bohlander ed., 2010).
65. Vladimir Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal Court: Problems
to Address in Light of the Experience of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 46 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 343, 359
(1999). The majority of judges who drafted the ICTY rules came from common law legal
systems, including an American judge who contributed a full set of rules that had been
prepared by a special committee of the American Bar Association. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 864
(1996) [hereinafter CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA].
66. Daryl A. Mundis, From ‘Common Law’ Towards ‘Civil Law’: The Evolution of the ICTY
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 14 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 367, 368 (2001). However, while the
movement toward civil law practices may be taking place, the preparation of case dossiers
in ICTY cases is less likely to highlight or segregate exculpatory evidence as would be the
case for dossiers prepared in civil law countries. Id. at 380 & n.74.
67. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 21.
68. Id. at art. 21(2).
69. Id. at art. 21(3).
70. Id. at art. 21(4)(a)–(e).
71. Id. at art. 21(4)(g).
72. See ICTR Statute, supra note 10, at art. 20(4)(g); Lebanon Statute, supra note 10, at
art. 16(4)(h). Both statutes correct the ICTY Statute’s lack of gender neutrality by stating
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However, the overall structure of the ICTY Statute strongly sug-
gests that the category of accused persons possessing Article 21 rights
is a narrow one that is limited to those who have passed through the
investigatory process.73 They are no longer persons of interest or even
suspects, but rather have entered the ICTY legal process and become
the objects of potential prosecution. The prosecutor will have deter-
mined that a prima facie case exists and will have fulfilled his or her
responsibility to “prepare an indictment containing a concise state-
ment of the facts and the crime or crimes with which the accused is
charged.”74 The final step to formalizing the individual’s status as an
accused occurs when the Trial Chamber, the ICTY’s trial level court,
confirms the indictment submitted by the prosecutor based on its
finding that the facts alleged would constitute a covered offense.75
Then, as an accused, the individual is entitled to all Article 21 rights,
including right to silence protection.
The right to silence language used in Article 21 describes the in-
dividual’s right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt. Its core component is the freedom to choose whether or
not to take the witness stand at trial, since that is where testimony
occurs. The right is waivable76 and, according to the case law, if the
defendant does choose to testify, he or she may not be compelled to
testify prior to other defense witnesses.77 However, the existence of
that the accused may not be compelled to testify against “himself or herself.” The same
language appears in the Sierra Leone Court’s statute. SCSL Statute, supra note 10, at art.
17(4)(g).
73. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at arts. 18–21.
74. Id. at art. 18(4) (emphasis added).
75. Pursuant to ICTY Statute art. 19(1), the prosecutor’s charge is presented to a
judge of the Trial Chamber who has the power to either confirm or dismiss the indictment.
Id. at art. 19(1). As a result, “[a]n individual stands accused once he or she is actually
indicted. Prior to indictment, the individual is only a ‘suspect.’” WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE
UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LE-
ONE 358 (2006) [hereinafter THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS].
76. Questioning of individuals must comply with the procedural requirements of the
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, R. P.
Evid., r. 63, U.N. Doc IT/32/Rev. 46 (2011) [hereinafter ICTY Rules]. Where those re-
quirements are followed, any resulting statement is “presumed to have been free and vol-
untary unless the contrary is proved.” Id. at r. 92.
77. Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Order on the Prosecutor’s Motion on
the Order of Appearance of Defence Witnesses and the Order of Cross-Examination by the
Prosecution and Counsel for the Co-Accused (Apr. 3, 1998). However, the court may take
into account the fact that the accused chose to give evidence after the testimony of all
other defense witnesses. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on Allega-
tions of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, ¶¶ 11 n.7, 129 (Jan. 31, 2000) (not-
ing Appeals Chamber ruling that it would “take into account the fact that [the accused]
had heard [the evidence of his witnesses] before giving his own.”) (citation omitted).
Summer 2012] RIGHT TO SILENCE IN THE HAGUE 19
the right does not necessarily mean that the decision not to testify is
free of all costs. One inevitable cost is that the fact finder will not hear
the suspect personally deny or explain the evidence produced by the
prosecutor. However, a more significant question is whether the fact
finder should be free to draw negative inferences from the defen-
dant’s decision not to testify.
Whether or not to draw adverse inferences from silence was a
question that arose in the post-World War II Yokohama War Crimes
Trials. There, applicable procedure permitted the prosecutor to com-
ment on the failure of the accused to testify and allowed adverse infer-
ences to be drawn from silence.78 Conversely, the American approach
in current domestic law bars judges from instructing the jury that it
may consider the defendant’s failure to take the witness stand to ex-
plain or deny negative evidence in reaching its verdict, even if the
matter is one within the defendant’s knowledge.79 Such an instruction
was viewed by the Supreme Court as “a penalty imposed by courts for
exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by
making its assertion costly.”80 This is true even though the imposition
of penalties for silence has been permitted in other settings.81
The decision to allow individuals to remain silent without eviden-
tiary consequences, however, is not without its critics. The issue was
the subject of a long running debate in the United Kingdom82 leading
up to the passage of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act.83 The
act allows juries to be instructed that they may draw adverse inferences
from both a defendant’s failure to take the witness stand and a sus-
pect’s failure to answer police questions, and has itself been the sub-
78. Paul Spurlock, The Yokohama War Crimes Trials: The Truth About a Misunderstood
Subject, 36 A.B.A. J. 387, 388 (1950).
79. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). Based on the due process clause,
the United States Supreme Court has also barred adverse comment on a defendant’s si-
lence following the administration of a Miranda warning. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
617–18 (1976). However, pre-arrest silence and post-arrest silence preceding a Miranda
warning can be used to impeach a defendant’s inconsistent testimony at trial. Fletcher v.
Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980).
80. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
81. See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35 (2002) (adverse consequence for refusal
to make admissions required for participation in sexual abuse treatment program permissi-
ble); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320 (1976) (adverse inference from silence at
prison disciplinary hearing permitted).
82. For a discussion of the lead up to the enactment of the legislation, as well as of the
impact of a similar procedure in Northern Ireland under the Criminal Justice (Evidence)
(Northern Ireland) Order, SI 1988/1847 (1988), see Reforming Confession Law British Style,
supra note 54.
83. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33.
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ject of a number of rulings from the ECHR. The conclusion of the
court has been that carefully structured adverse inference instructions
are not inconsistent with the “fair hearing” requirement of Article
6(1) of the European Convention.84 Thus, given that the ICTY Statute
and Rules do not explicitly address the permissible consequences that
may be imposed on the exercise of the right to silence, adoption of
the British approach by the ICTY would have had European Conven-
tion law to rely on for support.
In the end, however, the ICTY has not used the silence of an ac-
cused during questioning or at trial as a negative factor when deter-
mining guilt or innocence. This is exemplified by an ICTY Appeals
Chamber observation that “an absolute prohibition against considera-
tion of silence in the determination of guilt or innocence is guaran-
teed within the Statute and the Rules, reflecting what is now expressly
stated in the Rome Statute.”85 Subsequently, one Trial Chamber judg-
ment supported the ban against drawing adverse inferences from si-
lence by relying on the fact that the accused has the benefit of the
presumption of innocence, as well as the requirement that the prose-
cutor must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a convic-
tion.86 While the Chamber found that the burden of proof had been
met by the prosecutor without reliance on the accuseds’ silence, it
went on to comment, “Article 21(4)(g) of the Statute provides that no
accused shall be compelled to testify against him or herself. Mladen
Naletili and Vinko Martinovi decided not to testify at trial. In line with
Article 21(4)(g), the Chamber has not attached any probative value to
their decisions.”87
The principle that no adverse inferences may be drawn from the
failure of the accused to testify commonly goes unexplained in subse-
84. Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 81731/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 69 (1996).
However, the adverse inference instruction should incorporate notice that the inference
should not be drawn unless the jury was satisfied that “the applicants’ silence at the police
interview could only sensibly be attributed to their having no answer or none that would
stand up to cross-examination.” Condron v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶ 61
(2000). To the same effect is the ECHR ruling in Beckles v. United Kingdom. 36 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 162, ¶ 52 (2003). See generally Europeanizing Self-Incrimination, supra note 17; Mike
Redmayne, English Warnings, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047 (2008).
85. Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 783 (Feb. 20, 2001). The
Court opined that specific language authorizing the drawing of adverse inferences would
be required if that result had been intended by the Statute’s drafters. Id.
86. Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, ICTY Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 9
(Mar. 31, 2003).
87. Id.
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quent ICTY rulings.88 A similar approach has also been used by the
ICTR as illustrated in a Rwanda Tribunal Trial Chamber proceeding
in which the Chamber observed that the accused in a case before it
did not testify at his trial, but went on to state that the “[d]efence
made submissions concerning the right to remain silent and the right
not to testify. The Chamber is mindful of the Accused’s rights in this
regard and has not drawn any adverse inference in the present
case.”89
The conclusion that no adverse inferences may be drawn against
an individual who chooses to remain silent is based on the notion that
imposing such a consequence interferes with the exercise of the right
to be free of compulsion to testify. However, whether or not the threat
of an adverse inference constitutes compulsion, it clearly makes exer-
cise of the right not to testify more costly than would otherwise be the
case. In choosing not to use the evidence of silence against the ac-
cused, the ICTY and ICTR courts have sought to give maximum pro-
tection to the accused’s right to choose whether or not to exercise his
or her right to silence. Such an approach, moreover, is consistent with
the general policy to interpret the ICTY Rules on evidence questions
in a manner “which will best favour a fair determination of the matter
before it and [which is] consonant with the spirit of the Statute and
the general principles of law.”90
The fact that an accused may not be compelled to testify does not
prevent the accused from choosing to take the witness stand. In that
event, the accused becomes a witness subject to full cross-examina-
tion.91 However, in a concession to practice in civil law systems, under
the ICTY Rules, the accused may, with court permission, make an un-
sworn statement in which case he or she “shall not be examined about
the content of the statement.”92 In such cases, the Trial Chamber is
88. E.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶ 44 (Apr. 15, 2011)
(“Article 21 (4) (g) of the Statute provides that no accused shall be compelled to testify
against himself. In the present case all of the Accused chose not to testify. No adverse
inferences were drawn from this fact.”).
89. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 46
(May 16, 2003). Despite this conclusion, the Court noted that “human rights case law does
not contain a general prohibition against the drawing of adverse inferences from an ac-
cused’s silence,” citing the Murray and Condron decisions of the ECHR. Id. ¶ 46 n.12.
90. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 85(B).
91. Id. Rule 85(B) describes the procedure for the examination-in-chief, cross-exami-
nation and re-examination of witnesses. Id. Rule 85(C) provides that the accused “may
appear as a witness in his or her own defence.” Id. at 85(C).
92. Id. at r. 84(A) bis. This rule was added in 1999 and is illustrative of the incorpora-
tion of inquisitorial features into the ICTY system. Interview of Jean-Claude Antonetti,
Judge, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo., in The Hague, Netherlands (May 31,
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given discretion to decide what weight, if any, the statement shall
have.93 However, since the ICTY Rules do not specifically authorize
the Trial Chamber to give negative weight to a decision by the accused
to present an unsworn statement free of subjection to cross-examina-
tion, it is more likely that, given the prohibition against drawing nega-
tive inferences from silence, negative inferences from unsworn and
uncross-examined statements would similarly be barred.
In settings other than the guilt/innocence determination, how-
ever, the right to silence may be significantly less protected in ICTY
proceedings. One such area where ICTY courts have considered the
relevance of silence, other than in choosing not to take the witness
stand at trial, has been with respect to defendant applications for pro-
visional release. One ICTY ruling noted that an accused’s agreement
to be interviewed by the prosecutor was relevant to his provisional re-
lease application,94 while another noted that provisional release rul-
ings have considered whether an accused has substantially cooperated
with the prosecutor.95 At the same time, however, ICTY courts have
recognized the implications of this factor with respect to the right to
silence and have indicated that failure to cooperate with the prosecu-
tor does not constitute grounds to penalize the accused by denying
provisional release.96
As a result, although denial of provisional release solely due to a
lack of cooperation with the prosecutor would seem improper, the
accused is clearly at a disadvantage by losing “cooperation considera-
tion” if he or she invokes the right to silence. This can prove signifi-
2011). Slobodan Milos˘evic´, former President of Yugoslavia and Serbia, was among those
who took advantage of this option. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milos˘evic´, Case No. IT-02-54-T,
Public Transcript of Hearing February 13–18, 2002, 215–509 (Feb. 13, 2002). The variety
of possible approaches was illustrated in Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka, where two defendants testi-
fied at the start of the trial but were not cross-examined until the presentation of their
cases was finished. Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 779 (Nov. 2,
2001). One defendant gave a statement not under oath pursuant to Rule 84 (A) bis; and
two defendants declined to testify under oath and chose not to offer a statement without
taking the oath. Id.
93. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 84(B) bis.
94. Agreement to be interviewed by the prosecutor was listed as a factor relevant to
the provisional release decision in Prosecutor v. Sˇainovic´ & Ojdanic´. Prosecutor v. Sˇainovic´ &
Ojdanic´, Case No. IT-99-37-AR65, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 6 (Oct. 30, 2002).
95. Prosecutor v. Jokic´, Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Order on Miodrag Jokic´’s Motion for
Provisional Release, ¶ 26 (Feb. 20, 2002).
96. Prosecutor v. Halilovic´, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Decision of Admission Into Evidence
of Interview of the Accused, ¶ 13 (Jun. 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Sˇainovic´ and Ojdanic´, Case
No. IT-99-37-AR65, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 8 (Oct. 30, 2002); Prosecutor v.
Hadzˇihasanovic´, Case No. IT-01-47-PY, Decision Granting Provisional Release to Enver
Hadzˇihasanovic´, ¶ 15 (Dec. 19, 2001).
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cant when the cooperation factor is an important consideration in a
provisional release decision. The problem is similar in the context of
sentencing, although it has been noted in an ICTY sentencing judg-
ment that the ban against adverse inferences from silence applies in
the context of sentencing.97
Case law demonstrates that the ICTY has resisted efforts to take
advantage of silence by an accused in assessing whether guilt has been
proven and has also declined to rely on negative inferences from si-
lence as the basis for reaching other decisions under the controlling
ICTY Statute and Rules. This reflects the court’s effort to construct a
system of justice that leaves the accused free to insist that the prosecu-
tor prove guilt without pressuring the accused to participate by giving
evidence. The right to silence is thereby protected from serious intru-
sion and the larger system achieves a balance that contributes to the
broader acceptability of its results.
B. Non-Verbal Evidence
Even where oral testimony is not being sought from a suspect or
an accused, self-incrimination issues arise in other ways. As long as
official compulsion is involved, or a penalty is imposed that under-
mines the value of the right to remain silent, and the result of the
pressure is the production of evidence that is incriminating, the sub-
ject of the pressure can be said to have been compelled to testify
against him or herself. This problem is illustrated by official efforts to
force the production of bodily samples through the issuance of orders
directing an individual, upon threat of contempt, to perform some
action that will produce adverse evidence in a future prosecution. Ar-
guably, in situations such as these, the individual is “compelled to tes-
tify against himself” in violation of Article 21(4)(g) of the ICTY
Statute.
Domestically, the United States Supreme Court has addressed
this issue in a number of cases involving compelled identification pro-
97. Prosecutor v. Plavs˘ic´, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, ¶ 64, Sentencing Judgment (Feb.
27, 2003), noting that the “accused’s unwillingness to give evidence is not a factor to be
taken into account in determining sentence.” However, one commentator has observed
that “[f]or this right [to silence] to be effective, the consequence must be that no adverse
inference at trial can be drawn from a suspect’s refusal to cooperate or to be questioned.
Nevertheless, cooperation with the Tribunal from the earliest stage may well take on rele-
vance as a mitigating factor in the event that the suspect is later convicted.” THE UN INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 75, at 504.
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cedures.98 The Court concluded that these types of procedures are
permissible over a Fifth Amendment challenge on the theory that
physically identifying evidence is not testimonial for purposes of the
self-incrimination privilege.99 Individuals may even be ordered to per-
form affirmative acts that ultimately produce incriminatory evidence,
as long as the act itself does not contain a factual assertion or disclose
information.100
Similarly, the ECHR has adopted an approach in the application
of Article 6 of the European Convention that allows some physical
evidence to be compelled from a suspect or an accused. In Saunders v.
United Kingdom,101 the ECHR stated that right to silence protections
are inapplicable to demands for items “which may be obtained from
the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an
existence independent of the will of the suspect such as, inter alia,
documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine
samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing.”102 Whether
the ECHR decision would allow compulsion to force a suspect to per-
sonally turn over self-incriminatory documents, however, has not been
fully developed.103
98. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (holding compelled blood sam-
ples are not protected by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); see also
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–253 (1910) (finding no Fifth Amendment viola-
tion where defendant was required to put on a blouse to demonstrate that it fit).
99. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761. Because the Fifth Amendment precludes compelling a
defendant to be a “witness” against him or herself, and the role of a witness is to testify or
communicate, the scope of the self-incrimination privilege is limited to testimonially com-
municative evidence. Holt, 218 U.S. at 252–53 (“[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in
a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material.”).
100. See generally Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (holding defendant may be
forced to execute order to reveal his bank records over self-incrimination objection where
order does not relate any testimonial fact); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397
(1976) (holding a subpoena for documents does not violate the Fifth Amendment unless
the act of producing the documents involves implicit admissions of the existence of the
documents, their authenticity, or their possession or control by the recipient of the sub-
poena). However, if the act of producing a subpoenaed document reveals the existence,
possession or authenticity of the item, the Fifth Amendment will bar the enforcement of
the subpoena. Doe v. United States, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.11 (1984) (Fifth Amendment
barred subpoena for documents directed to sole proprietor based on district court conclu-
sion that enforcement would “admit that the records exist, that they are in [the defen-
dant’s] possession, and that they are authentic.”) (quoting In re Grand Jury Empanelled
Mar. 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1981).
101. Eur. Ct. H.R. 313 (1996).
102. Id. at ¶ 69.
103. Andrew Ashworth, Self-Incrimination in European Human Rights Law–A Pregnant
Pragmatism?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 751, 758–60 (2008).
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An issue comparable to those addressed by the United States Su-
preme Court and the ECHR was confronted in one ICTY Trial Cham-
ber decision in which the prosecution sought to compel the
production of a handwriting sample.104 That case, Prosecutor v. De-
lalic´,105 involved an effort by the prosecutor to introduce a letter alleg-
edly written by the accused to a witness approximately a month prior
to that witness’ testimony.106 The defense objected that there was no
evidence in support of the claim that the accused actually wrote the
letter. As part of the prosecution’s response, it sought an order di-
recting the accused to produce a handwriting sample subject to the
threat of an adverse inference if the accused failed to comply.107 In
support of its request, the prosecutor emphasized that it did not “seek
a statement wherein [the defendant would] admit guilt or through
which knowledge of specific circumstances [might] be inferred
. . . .”108 However, the defense countered that it was enough that pro-
viding a handwriting sample would “enable the determination of the
authorship of the letter [which] would have the effect of compelling
[the accused] to contribute to the process of incriminating himself,
which [would] be a violation of his protection against self-incrimina-
tion, an essential element of a fair trial.”109
Nevertheless, despite the existence of precedents from other
courts favoring the prosecution’s theory, the Trial Chamber held that
“where the material factor absent in the incriminating elements is the
handwriting sample of the accused, the Trial Chamber cannot compel
the accused to supply the missing element. To do so will be to infringe
the provisions of Article 21 sub-paragraph 4(g) which protects the ac-
cused from self-incrimination.”110 Forcing the accused to “assist the
Prosecution in its investigation, and probably provide the evidence to
incriminate himself”111 was enough to implicate the right to silence
104. Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Oral
Requests for the Admission of Exhibit 155 into Evidence and for an Order to Compel the
Accused, Zdravko Mucic´, to Provide a Handwriting Sample, ¶ 5 (Jan. 19, 1998).
105. Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Oral Requests for the Admis-
sion of Exhibit 155 into Evidence and for an Order to Compel the Accused, Zdravko Mu-
cic´, to Provide a Handwriting Sample, ¶ 5 (Jan. 19, 1998).
106. Id.
107. Id. ¶ 6.
108. Id. ¶ 18.
109. Id. ¶ 24.
110. Id. ¶ 47.
111. Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Oral
Requests for the Admission of Exhibit 155 into Evidence and for an Order to Compel the
Accused, Zdravko Mucic´, to Provide a Handwriting Sample, ¶ 48 (Jan. 19, 1998).
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interests protected by the ICTY Statute and Rules, since “[t]here is no
duty in law or morals for the accused to fill a vacuum created by the
investigative procedural gap of the Prosecution.”112 Relying on the
language of Article 21, the ruling found the controlling language to
be “clear and unambiguous” and not “qualified, or restricted to testi-
monial evidence.”113
The decision to deny an order compelling the production of a
handwriting sample is separate from the question of whether produc-
tion of an incriminatory document would be compellable. Providing a
handwriting sample involves an act of will significantly greater than
the act of turning over an identified item, and it is arguable that the
right to silence prohibits the former without necessarily prohibiting
the latter.
How the ICTY might decide this matter is somewhat unclear, de-
spite a decision by the ICTY President in Prosecutor v. Delalic´114 on a
motion to compel the production of notes passed between two incar-
cerated defendants that the ICTY Registrar had seized.115 The notes
were categorized as material that was “produced, circulated or com-
municated in breach of the Rules of Detention or Regulations,” but
the Registrar was deemed to have “discretion whether or not to pro-
vide such material to the Prosecutor.”116 However, the President of
the ICTY had the ultimate decision making authority as to whether
the notes had to be produced, given the fact that a motion to compel
their disclosure had been filed.117 He concluded that the decision
whether to order production required that the prosecutor demon-
strate that the documents would be “necessary (not simply useful or
helpful) for the purposes of the investigation or for the preparation
or conduct of the trial,”118 a standard the President found the prose-
cutor had met.119 As a result, disclosure could be ordered.
Despite recognizing the importance and relevance of the evi-
dence, the Delaliæ opinion was careful to caution that disclosure of the
112. Id. ¶ 49.
113. Id. ¶ 58.
114. Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision of the President on the Prose-
cutor’s Motion for the Production of Notes Exchanged Between Zejnil Delalic´ and Zdravko
Mucic´ (Nov. 11, 1996).
115. Id. ¶ 1.
116. Id. ¶ 31. However, it is also necessary to provide “prior notice and disclosure to
counsel for the detainee” since this will “ensure that the detainee’s rights are respected.”
Id.
117. Id. ¶¶ 9,10.
118. Id. ¶ 38.
119. Id. ¶ 42.
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notes to the prosecutor would not automatically warrant the admissi-
bility of the notes at trial,120 thus distinguishing between investigatory
disclosure of evidence and the later effort to have that evidence admit-
ted at trial. It thus remains possible that, if documents created by an
individual remain in his or her possession, their compelled disclosure
and subsequent introduction at trial could be barred, even if the de-
fendant was required to turn over the documents to the prosecutor
during the investigatory phase of the proceeding. Presumably, the rea-
son for this possible result might be the fact that the individual would
be compelled to perform an affirmative act that would reveal testimo-
nial evidence he or she created through an effort of will, and this
would be barred because of the defendant’s right to silence at trial.
C. Pre-Trial Investigations
The ICTY Statute anticipates that an investigatory stage will pre-
cede the decision to present an indictment to the Trial Chamber. This
is the thrust of Article 18 of the ICTY Statute, which provides that the
prosecutor has the authority to initiate investigations based upon in-
formation received from “any source,”121 during the course of which
he or she may “question suspects, victims, and witnesses . . . .”122 How-
ever, no reference to a right to remain silent appears in the Statute at
this point. That occurs only after the suspect is turned into an accused
who is possessed of Article 21 due process rights,123 thereby suggesting
that the Article 21 right to silence, at least in its Article 21 form, would
not be applicable to an Article 18 investigation. This is a distinction
recognized in a Trial Chamber ruling that Article 21(4)(d) legal assis-
tance rights are inapplicable in connection with the interrogation of a
suspect. Simply put, an “Accused cannot claim the benefit of Article
21(4)(d)—benefit due to an accused—at a time when he was still a
suspect.”124
120. Id. ¶ 45.
121. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 18(1).
122. Id. at art. 18(2).
123. The Statute’s description of the required procedure first refers to “the accused” at
the point that the Trial Chamber reads the indictment to the individual and instructs him
or her to enter a plea. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 20(3). Nevertheless, suspects are
given the right to have the assistance of counsel if questioned during the investigatory
phase, and counsel may be provided without cost to the individual if he or she cannot
afford to pay for representation. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 18(3).
124. Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-91-21-T, Decision on the Motion for the Exclu-
sion of Evidence by the Accused, Zejnil Delalic´, ¶ 36 (Sept. 25, 1997). Professor Bassiouni
has also recognized this distinction, observing that “[t]he Statutes and rules of the ICTY,
ICTR, and the ICC make a distinction between the rights of suspects and those of the
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The fact that there is a distinction between accused persons and
suspects is further developed in the definitions section of the ICTY
Rules. The relevant provisions identify suspects as those about whom
the prosecutor has reliable information tending to show that he or
she committed a covered offense, while accused persons are those
who have been charged in a confirmed indictment.125 Despite the dif-
ference between the two categories, however, there can be no serious
doubt that suspects may be in as much need of self-incrimination pro-
tection as those who have been charged and therefore have acquired
Article 21 rights.126 Thus, it is not surprising that the ICTY insists that
statements offered by the prosecutor in a Tribunal proceeding be
shown to have been “obtained voluntarily . . . [and] in compliance
with the requirements set out in the Rules . . . .”127 Nevertheless, there
is no explanation as to why the ICTY Statute provided a right to si-
lence protection to accused persons, but failed to address the issue
with respect to suspects.128
The absence of a statutory right to silence did not prevent the
drafters of the ICTY Rules from incorporating language that provides
accused. Thus, the rights that attach to each category are not separable since the rights of a
suspect necessarily have an impact on the rights of that person as an accused.” INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at 646 (footnotes omitted). More
generally, however, the ICTY Statute and procedural rules must be interpreted in conform-
ance with international human rights standards. CALVO-GOLLER, supra note 52, at 164. This
general principle may lessen the significance of the suspect/accused distinction otherwise
created by the ICTY Statute.
125. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 2(A).
126. “Unless [the right to silence] is recognized to operate at this stage, it would have
little significance to the accused later on, because the fate of the criminal case is usually
determined by what goes on at the pretrial interrogation sessions.” Daniel D. Ntanda Nser-
eko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5
CRIM. L.F. 507, 524 (1994).
127. Prosecutor v. Halilovic´, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Decision on Admission into Evidence
of Interview of the Accused, ¶ 10 (Jun. 20, 2005). In its ruling, the Tribunal explained that
it found no evidence to support the claim that voluntariness of the statement by the ac-
cused was undermined as a result of prosecutor promises for provisional release and/or
withdrawal of the indictment. Id. ¶ 11.
128. Some difference of opinion exists as to the significance of the omission of specific
reference to the right to silence in the Article 18 description of suspects’ rights during an
ICTY investigation. One author has stated that the right to silence contained in the Article
21 statement of the rights of the accused “means that from the earliest stage in the investi-
gation, a ‘suspect’ or an accused need not speak to investigators or otherwise cooperate by
providing information.” THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 75, at
532. However, another commentator noted the absence of a definition of the term “sus-
pect” in the Statute and observed that it is “difficult to know when exactly a person be-
comes a ‘suspect’ and whether the investigation of the Prosecutor was appropriately
conducted during every one of its phases.” CALVO-GOLLER, supra note 52, at 27.
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suspects with a right to be free of compelled self-incrimination.129
Rule 42, titled “Rights of Suspects during Investigation,” lists specific
rights available to suspects who are subject to questioning by the pros-
ecutor, with an additional requirement that suspects be warned of
their rights before questioning begins.130 The protections available to
suspects include the right to the assistance of counsel, free of charge if
necessary,131 and the right to an interpreter if he or she does not
speak the same language as the questioner.132 But the suspect also has
protection against compelled self-incrimination, even though this
right was not part of the ICTY’s statutory framework.
The form of the right to silence protection afforded by Rule 42
has both substantive and procedural components. Substantively, the
rule specifically provides suspects who are to be questioned by the
prosecutor with “the right to remain silent.”133 Procedurally, the sus-
pect must be informed that he has the right to remain silent,134 but
also that any statement he makes “shall be recorded and may be used
in evidence.”135 Additionally, counsel must be present during ques-
tioning unless there has been a voluntary waiver, although the right to
129. The inclusion of a rule-based right to silence is appropriate since it is certainly
unlikely that the Statute’s drafters intended to deprive suspects who have not yet been
charged of that right, and in any event prosecutorial practice has been to respect the deci-
sion of individuals at the pre-indictment stage to decline to answer official questions. Inter-
view of Mark B. Harmon, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo., in The
Hague, Netherlands (June 5, 2011). However, unlike the accused, who are free to decline
to take the witness stand at trial, ICTY suspects are not free to avoid questioning entirely.
One author stated, “it seems to be a fait accompli that the suspect must submit to the
questioning process by the prosecutor.” Ntanda Nsereko, supra note 126, at 524. Unlike
American criminal procedure, in which suspects may refuse to be questioned by invoking
their Miranda rights (unless they have been summoned before a grand jury), ICTY proce-
dure appears to contemplate that suspects are subject to questioning, although they may
protect themselves by invoking the right not to be compelled to incriminate themselves.
However, it is not clear whether a suspect in such a situation has any obligation to answer
any question, self-incriminatory or not. Beyond that, the right to counsel—available to sus-
pects at this point, pursuant to ICTY Rule 42(A)(1)—should minimize the risk that interro-
gator tactics will pressure suspects into answering questions.
130. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 42(A).
131. Id. at r. 42(A)(i).
132. Id. at r. 42(A)(ii).
133. Id. at r. 42(A)(iii).
134. As a suspect’s Rule 42 right, it must be part of the warning given by the prosecutor
prior to questioning. Id. at r. 42(A).
135. Id. at r. 42(A)(iii). Rule 43 reaffirms the prosecutor’s obligation to inform the
suspect that the questioning is being recorded, id. at r. 43(i), and adds other details, in-
cluding the obligation to provide the suspect with a copy of the recorded tape, id. at r.
43(iv), along with the transcript if the suspect becomes an accused, id. at r. 43(vi).
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counsel may be reasserted following a waiver, in which case question-
ing must cease until counsel has been obtained or assigned.136
Further procedural protection for suspects subjected to question-
ing is provided by Rule 43. In order to insure the accuracy of any
evidence of statements made during the questioning of a suspect, that
rule creates a duty to record the interrogation in audio or video
form.137 In at least one case, failure to satisfy this requirement led to
the exclusion of a statement at the ICTY,138 even though the individ-
ual who made the statement had not yet been accused of a covered
offense, nor was clearly a suspect in the crime with which he was later
charged.139
Pursuant to Rule 43, the suspect may also provide a clarification
of anything he or she has said and add further information.140 Addi-
tionally, a copy of the recording must be given to the suspect,141 and a
transcription must be made if the suspect becomes an accused.142 Per-
haps because of the substantial procedural protections that are incor-
porated in the interrogation process, the ICTY Rules go on to provide
that a “confession by the accused given during questioning by the
prosecutor shall, provided the requirements of Rule 63 were strictly
complied with, be presumed to have been free and voluntary unless
the contrary is proved.”143 While this provision clearly allocates the
burden of persuasion to the defendant when he or she challenges the
admissibility of a confession, the standard of proof on this issue is not
set forth in the rules.
136. Id. at r. 42(B).
137. Id. at r. 43. The duty is a mandatory one arising out of language providing that the
questioning of a suspect by the prosecutor “shall” be audio or video recorded. Id.
138. Prosecutor v. Halilovic´, Case No. IT-01-48, Decision on the Motion for Exclusion
of Statement of Accused, ¶ 27 (Jul. 8, 2005).
139. Id. ¶ 12. Halilovic´ was interviewed on his own initiative. As a result, a twenty-five
page statement was produced. Id. ¶ 2. The Court opined that a voluntary statement taken
in compliance with the Rules could be tendered as evidence, id. ¶ 18, and that there had
been a proper warning of the right to remain silent followed by a voluntary waiver. Id. ¶ 22.
However, the extensive questioning of Halilovic´ made it necessary to have a recording
available to allow the defense to verify the accuracy of the statement without forcing testi-
mony from the defendant. Since no recording was made, exclusion of the statement was
required. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. See generally Luzzati, supra note 61, at 224–25.
140. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 43(iii).
141. Id. at r. 43(iv).
142. Id.
143. Id. at r. 92. The requirements of Rule 63 pertain to the right to counsel in connec-
tion with questioning of an accused. Id. at r. 63. In such cases counsel’s presence is re-
quired unless specifically waived. Id. at r. 63(A). Recording is required of any waiver of the
right to counsel as well as of any statements the individual may make in accordance with
the procedures set forth in Rule 43. Id. at r. 63(B).
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It would have been a grievous flaw had the ICTY failed to recog-
nize the need to protect the silence interests of individuals who had
not yet been formally charged with an offense. In the end, however,
this statutory omission was corrected in the ICTY Rules in a manner
that provides the full range of self-incrimination protection. Suspects
receive a warning, are protected by the right to counsel, and have the
benefit of the accuracy provided by audio or video recordings. If all of
the steps are followed, it would not seem difficult for the prosecutor
to establish the voluntariness of any resulting statement. In this light,
presuming the voluntariness of any resulting statement seems a bit
unnecessary and heavy handed. Establishing flaws in the questioning
process that could have affected the resulting statement is difficult
enough without adding the extra weight of a thumb on the prosecu-
tor’s side of the scale.
D. Witnesses and the Right to Silence
Although suspects and accused persons have an absolute right to
silence protection under the ICTY Statute and Rules, a different ap-
proach applies to witnesses.144 One variant is the absence of any spe-
cific requirement in either the Statute or Rules for administering a
warning to witnesses describing their right to silence if the response to
a question could be self-incriminatory. If the witness’ statement is nev-
ertheless voluntary, the structure of the Statute and Rules suggest the
possibility of using that statement in the witness’ own trial.
However, one ICTY Trial Chamber reviewing the admissibility of
a voluntary witness statement obtained under such conditions de-
clined to admit the statement on the grounds that the witness’ rights
were not adequately protected at the time that he made the unwarned
declaration. The decision noted that:
[F]or [the right to remain silent] to be not merely theoretical but
truly effective, the witness must know not only that, should this be
necessary, he may refuse to answer the questions if his answers
might incriminate but also that, if despite everything, he chooses to
answer such questions voluntarily, his statements might, depending
on the case, be used against him. Only in this last scenario, that is,
when a witness is aware of the existence of this right and the conse-
144. Although international human rights documents may not be worded in a manner
that includes any self-incrimination protection for witnesses, it has been noted that the
application of the right to remain silent to witnesses under international declarations is
justified by a “systematic and teleological interpretation, supported by comparative law . . . .” Kai
Ambos, The Right of Non-Self-Incrimination of Witnesses Before the ICC, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.,
155, 161–2 (2002) [hereinafter The Right of Non-Self-Incrimination of Witnesses Before the ICC]
(emphasis in original).
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quences deriving from a possible waiver of this right, can the
waiver be valid.145
Whether or not a witness is warned of his right to silence and the
consequences of waiving that right, if the questions asked of him are
potentially self-incriminatory, the witness, like suspects and accused
persons, may object based upon the right to silence.146 Significantly,
however, per the conditions applicable to suspects and accused per-
sons, the ICTY Statute and Rules allow the court to direct that the
witness answer the question even over a self-incrimination based ob-
jection. But where such a direction is given, any information so pro-
vided, except for false testimony, may not be used against the
individual in a subsequent proceeding.147
The idea of providing a form of immunity in return for com-
pelled testimony is a familiar one, but the language of the applicable
rule states only that “[t]estimony compelled in this way shall not be
used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution against the witness for
any offence other than false testimony.”148 This limited use immunity
does not go as far as the use and derivative use protection required for
compelled testimony under the United States Constitution’s Fifth
Amendment.149 Moreover, there is also no indication in the applica-
145. Prosecutor v. Prlic´, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Decision on the Admission into Evidence
of Slobodan Praljak’s Evidence in the case of Naletelic´ and Martinovic´, ¶ 19 (Sept. 5,
2007). In the case before it, the Trial Chamber added that “the only way it can be certain
that the witness expressly waived his right to remain silent is to have a guarantee that he
was duly informed of and cautioned about that right at the time of his testimony.” Id. ¶ 20.
146. Id.
147. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 90(E). The International Criminal Court allows
compelling, potentially self-incriminatory information from a witness in return for a form
or immunity, labeled an “assurance” in ICC Rule 74. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 93 ¶
2; Int’l Criminal Court, R. P. & Evid., r. 74, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002) [hereinafter
ICC Rules]. ICC Rule 74 states that the evidence provided by the witness in response to
questions following an assurance will not be used “directly or indirectly” against the indi-
vidual in any future ICC proceeding, id. at r. 74(3)(c)(ii), and will be kept confidential by
not being disclosed publicly or to any state, id. at r. 74(3)(c)(i).
148. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 90(E). A broader view of the underlying right
might suggest that no potentially self-incriminatory statement may be compelled from a
witness, even with a grant of some form of immunity, since this would offend the ‘general
right of personality’ which includes protection of the individual’s reputation. However,
“virtually no legal system attributes to the nemo tenetur principle a meaning as wide as to
encompass the right of personality.” The Right of Non-Self-Incrimination of Witnesses Before the
ICC, supra note 144, at 163.
149. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (finding use and derivative use
immunity coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Zi-
carelli v. N.J. State Comm’n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 475–76 (1972) (finding that a
New Jersey statute providing use and derivative use immunity satisfies the Fifth Amend-
ment). In the United States, use and derivative use immunity cover evidence discovered
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ble ICTY Rules as to the standards that should govern the decision of
a Trial Judge in determining whether the circumstances warrant com-
pelling testimony from the witness in return for use immunity.150
The drafters of the ICTY Statute and Rules, while allowing testi-
mony to be compelled from a witness as long as some immunity pro-
tection is provided in return, did not provide that option in the
treatment of suspects or accused persons. There is no mechanism
under any of the international tribunal authorizing documents to
compel testimony from a resistant suspect or defendant, regardless of
the immunity offer the prosecutor is prepared to make, even to the
point of full transactional immunity. However, that does not mean
that testimony from an accused cannot be acquired through other
methods.
One such method is a voluntary plea agreement in which the
prosecutor grants a concession acceptable to the accused in return for
his or her testimony.151 The concession may involve a reduced sen-
tence or, at the extreme, provide the individual with full transactional
immunity. Either way, the effect of the individual’s acceptance of the
concession is to change his or her status into that of a witness who
gives voluntary testimony. What is less clear is whether the prosecutor
may treat the individual as a witness before charges are filed, even
though it seems likely that he or she will ultimately be charged with a
covered offense. Theoretically, the prosecutor could then seek com-
pelled testimony in return for an appropriate immunity grant and
thereafter be barred from using the testimony when the individual
becomes an accused. In formal terms the process would seem permis-
sible, even though it is clearly manipulative. However, if the manipula-
tion could be proven, it would seem that this would constitute
through reliance on the content of the compelled statement, as well as the compelled
statement itself. See TAKING THE FIFTH, supra note 14, at 66–72.
150. Under American law, the decision to grant immunity is viewed as an executive
responsibility, although federal prosecutors are obligated to comply with the procedural
requirement of the immunity statute. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616–17 (1984)
(“We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include prospective grants of use im-
munity in the absence of the formal request that the [federal immunity] statute
requires.”).
151. Guilty pleas are permitted pursuant to ICTY Rules 62(vi), 62 bis, and 62 ter, as long
as they are voluntary, informed, unequivocal and supported by a factual basis. ICTY Rules,
supra note 76, at r. 62(vi), 62 bis, 62 ter. Similar requirements are part of the guilty plea
procedures of the International Criminal Court. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 65.
However, ICTY plea procedure practices have been questioned. Julian A. Cook, III, Plea
Bargaining at The Hague, 30 YALE J. INT’L LAW 473, 506 (2005).
34 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
adequate grounds for the tribunal to refuse to compel the testimony
being sought.
If the individual is compelled to provide testimony as a witness, a
separate question arises as to the inter-jurisdictional scope of immu-
nity the international tribunal can provide. It is clear under the ICTY
Rules that compelled testimony cannot be used in any ICTY proceed-
ing, other than in the context of a false testimony prosecution.152 But
can immunity provided by the ICTY have an impact on national gov-
ernment proceedings where the compelled testimony would be of evi-
dentiary relevance and incriminatory to the individual who was
compelled to provide it? In one instance, a prosecutorial effort was
made to limit the scope of the defense’s cross-examination of a wit-
ness—who was the subject of a criminal investigation by the govern-
ment of Bosnia and Herzegovina—by barring questions regarding
instances of that witness’s conduct.153 (No formal charges had yet
been filed in the national government case.). While the court refused
to curtail cross-examination of the witness because of the potential
relevance of the subject to the witness’ credibility and reliability, it did
state that “the safeguards provided by Rule 90(E) to the witness only
apply before the Tribunal, and do not bind the BiH [Bosnia and Her-
zegovina] authorities.”154
The court did offer alternative suggestions to protect the witness,
such as holding closed cross-examination sessions, or reminding the
parties that the witness may also avail himself of the assistance of coun-
sel. Of course, these solutions would not prevent information from
leaking out and reaching prosecuting officials in any location where
the individual was being investigated. On the other hand, the court
also noted that the trial judge has the authority to control questioning
pursuant to Rule 90(F), although the rules state that the purpose be-
hind this authority is to “(i) make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth; and (ii) avoid needless
consumption of time.”155 It is not clear that special concerns related
to testimony compelled from a witness are a relevant Rule 90(F)
consideration.
What the court did not discuss, and perhaps should have, is
whether potential prosecution by a national government should play a
152. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 90(E).
153. Prosecutor v. Peris˘ic´, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for an
Advance Ruling on the Scope of Permissible Cross-Examination, ¶ 20 (Jun.12, 2009).
154. Id. ¶ 21.
155. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 90(F)(i)–(ii).
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role in the ICTY decision to compel the witness to testify over a self-
incrimination claim. ICTY Rule 90(E) makes the decision to compel
testimony a discretionary one,156 and the risk of incrimination by an-
other sovereign could be taken into account in deciding whether to
compel the testimony in return for a use immunity grant. Despite ar-
guments in favor of this approach,157 the United States Supreme
Court declined to consider potential foreign incrimination in decid-
ing whether a valid self-incrimination claim could be raised,158 and
the ICTY court seems to have taken the same view.
In broader terms, there is a certain logic in separating witnesses
from suspects and accused persons in defining the scope of the right
to silence in ICTY proceedings. True witnesses are sought only for the
information they can provide, and therefore, it is theoretically un-
likely that compelled testimony coupled with a use immunity grant
presents much of a risk that they will also be prosecuted in the ICTY.
On the other hand, it may well be true that many witnesses are, or
become, entangled in the proceedings to the point that they do face
real risks of prosecution. For that reason, full-scale warnings and pro-
cedural protections are necessary when witnesses are questioned, and
extreme care must be taken that they are not compelled to answer
questions when a real risk of their ultimate prosecution can be
identified.
E. The Exclusion Remedy
The enforcement of international standards of conduct is at the
core of the ICTY’s responsibility. This is reflected in not only the of-
fenses within the court’s jurisdiction, but also in the standards of be-
havior required in the performance of the court’s function. Toward
this end, the ICTY Statute grants the court substantial authority to
develop evidentiary rules that comply with international norms, and
this power has been used to develop a standard to govern the exclu-
sion of evidence when those norms have been violated. In its original
form, adopted in 1994, the applicable rule stated that “[e]vidence ob-
tained directly or indirectly by means which constitute a serious viola-
tion of internationally protected human rights shall not be
156. Id. at r. 90(E).
157. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201, 1270 –94 (1998).
158. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (holding foreign prosecution
beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause).
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admissible.”159 Exclusion pursuant to this language was mandatory in
cases involving serious human rights violations, although the identifi-
cation of the applicable standards and the level of violation that would
be considered serious were not specified.
In 1995, however, that rule was amended to its present form,
which calls for exclusion if evidence was “obtained by methods which
cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical
to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.”160
The amendment thus involved a refocus from the objective of protect-
ing human rights standards as applied to the enforcement process, to
an assessment of the impact of the methods used on the reliability of
the evidence and the integrity of the proceedings. This formulation is
more attuned to the civil law inquisitorial system in which the pro-
ceedings are seen much more as a search for truth rather than an
adversarial battle. Indeed, as noted by one commentator, the ICTY
“adopted a discretionary approach to the admission of evidence that
favored the inquisitorial model for admissibility. This approach gives
judges a greater role in weighing evidence.”161 As a result, it is impos-
sible to predict whether a violation of right to silence standards in the
acquisition of evidence will lead to the application of the exclusionary
remedy in ICTY proceedings.
Nevertheless, even though the ICTY’s approach to the admission
of evidence is in line with the inquisitorial system’s preference for ad-
mitting contested evidence and then subsequently weighing its proba-
tive value, as opposed to the accusatorial system’s preference for more
carefully crafted evidence admissibility standards, violation of the
right to silence principles has resulted in the exclusion of a statement
obtained as the result of an official interrogation. This occurred fol-
lowing a challenge to statements made to Austrian Police in Vienna
under a local rule that informed the suspect, “You may not have legal
Counsel present when you are questioned for a criminal offence.”162
Although other aspects of the interrogation were found not to run
159. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 95.
160. Id.
161. DeFrancia, supra note 18, at 1397–98.
162. Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-91-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucic´’s Motion
for the Exclusion of Evidence, ¶ 50 (Sept. 2, 1997). In a subsequent ruling involving defen-
dant Delalic´, the Trial Chamber denied exclusion of statements where the claim was made
that the recording process violated the terms of Article 43. The denial was based on the
conclusion that there was no substantial doubt as to the reliability of the statements, nor
was there any risk to the integrity of the proceedings. Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-91-
21-T, Decision on the Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence by the Accused, Zejnil Delalic´,
¶ 45 (Sept. 25, 1997).
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afoul of admissibility standards, the denial of counsel alone was
deemed to warrant suppression.163 So too, statements found to be in-
voluntary or obtained by oppressive methods would be inadmissible,
since they “cannot pass the test under Rule 95.”164 In contrast, state-
ments that are voluntary and follow voluntary waivers of the right to
silence, will be admitted in an ICTY proceeding.165
Over time the ICTY has moved toward an exclusion principle gov-
erned by the reliability of the evidence that is being challenged.166
The current exclusion standard also seeks to protect the integrity of
the proceedings, but this seems to be more of an afterthought. In con-
trast, the initial formulation of the exclusion principle focused on the
extent to which the conduct that produced the evidence seriously vio-
lated international human rights standards. This approach could lead
to the exclusion of even reliable evidence if the human rights viola-
tion is serious enough.
The ultimate question to be decided, assuming sufficient confi-
dence in the reliability of the evidence, is how far the system is willing
to go to enforce standards through the deterrent effect of the exclu-
163. The Trial Chamber concluded that “the Austrian rights of the suspect are so fun-
damentally different from the rights under the International Tribunal’s Statute and Rules
as to render the statement made under it inadmissible.” Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-
91-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucic´’s Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence, ¶ 52 (Sept. 2,
1997). The Trial Chamber further noted that violations of ICTY Rules 42(A)(1) and 42(B)
relating to the assistance of counsel in connection with an interrogation “by themselves
would be sufficient by virtue of Rule 5 to render the statements before the Austrian Police
null and inadmissible in proceedings before us and to be excluded.” Id. ¶ 55. In contrast, it
was also found that “[t]here was no evidence that the duration of the interview excited in
[the defendant] hopes of release or any fears which made his will crumble thereby prompt-
ing statements he otherwise would not have made.” Id. ¶ 69.
164. Id. ¶ 41. See also Prosecutor v. Halilovic´, Case No. IT-01-48-AR73.2, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Admission of Record of Interview of the Accused From
the Bar Table, ¶¶ 63–66 (Aug. 19, 2005) (excluding statements upon Appeals Chamber
finding that the Trial Chamber failed to consider prosecutor inducements and compe-
tence of counsel, respectively, in ruling on statement admissibility).
165. Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-91-21-T, Decision on Hazim Delic´’s Motions
Pursuant to Rule 73, ¶ 18 (Sept. 1, 1997) (denying exclusion where waiver of right to
silence was voluntary, even if based on a mistake as to the consequence of the waiver);
Prosecutor v. Milutinovic´, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Admit
Documentary Evidence, ¶ 44 (Oct. 10, 2006) (finding that where statement is free and
voluntary, the right to silence may not be retroactively invoked).
166. Professor Mirjan Damaska argues that the nature of the crimes dealt with by inter-
national criminal courts, the practical difficulties encountered in securing evidence of
guilt, and the heightened weight given to the goal of securing justice for the victims of the
offenses has had an impact on the courts’ view of what constitutes fair procedure.
Damas˘ka, supra note 51, at 387. On how this has affected admission standards for evidence
obtained through oppressive interrogation techniques and illegal intercepts, see id. at
385–86.
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sion of evidence. Deterrence has been the guiding principle of the
American exclusionary rule, although its role has been limited in situ-
ations other than the trial itself.167 Nevertheless, it might be a more
difficult principle to enforce in situations where evidence has not
been acquired by Tribunal investigators. In the final analysis, however,
a sensitive view of how evidence acquisition techniques can impact the
integrity of the ICTY structure may well be adequate to produce the
desired results.
F. Post-Charge Questioning
As a practical matter, questioning of victims, witnesses and sus-
pects is an inevitable part of the ICTY prosecutor’s investigatory re-
sponsibility. However, once a suspect has become an accused person,
his or her status changes substantially. Accused persons have been
filtered through the investigation process to become indicted individ-
uals. They have been formally charged and will most likely be prose-
cuted unless they plead guilty or have their cases dismissed for some
other reason.
As a result, further questioning of suspects who have become ac-
cused persons would not further the purpose of determining whether
there are sufficient grounds to believe a crime was committed by the
accused, since confirmation of the indictment by the Trial Chamber
already indicates this objective has been achieved. Instead, the ques-
tioning of the accused most likely would be for the purpose of amas-
sing further evidence of guilt. Because of this different purpose, the
decision whether to allow interrogation at this stage of the proceed-
ings presents issues that are distinct from the questions that arise in
determining whether suspects may be required to respond to the pros-
ecutor’s inquiries.
It is true that Article 21 of the ICTY statute identified the right
not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt as one of the rights of
the accused. Both the language of the self-incrimination protection
contained in Article 21, as well as the context of the entire article,
suggests that its focus is the adjudicatory process before the court.
Strictly read, however, Article 21(4)(g) allows the accused to be free
from compulsion to take the witness stand at trial or plead guilty to
any charges that have been filed against him or her. It does not neces-
167. The U.S. Supreme Court has looked for an “incremental deterrent effect” in situa-
tions where it must decide whether to extend the exclusionary rule beyond the confines of
the criminal trial itself. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974) (declining to
apply the exclusionary rule to a grand jury investigation).
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sarily mean that the prosecutor may subject the accused to further
questioning outside of the courtroom. Nor does any other provision
of the ICTY Statute suggest that there is any such right.168
In the end, the drafters of the ICTY Rules included language spe-
cifically covering the questioning of accused persons as opposed to
suspects.169 Indeed, Rule 63 is entitled “Questioning of Accused” and
refers to “[q]uestioning by the Prosecutor of the accused, including
after the initial appearance . . . .”170 However, having provided for
right to silence protection for suspects during the investigatory phase,
the rules naturally afford similar protection to those further along in
the process.
Initially, the prosecutor must administer a warning to the accused
that informs him or her of the right to remain silent and that any
statement that the accused makes will be recorded and may be used in
evidence.171 In addition, no questioning of an accused may take place
“without the presence of counsel unless the accused has voluntarily
and expressly agreed to proceed without counsel present.”172 The
Rules provide that the accused is free to change his or her mind and
reassert the right to counsel. Where this option is exercised, question-
ing must cease until counsel is present.173 Finally, both the question-
ing and any waiver of the right to counsel are subject to the recording
requirements of Rule 43, which includes the obligation to provide the
individual questioned with a copy of the tape and a transcription if the
individual later becomes an accused.174 Clearly, the objective of the
right to silence protections is to ensure that the accused is not im-
168. The issue is one that has been under consideration in the United Kingdom, with
the suggestion that its scope might be limited to judicial examination in cases of terrorism
or other complex offenses. Clive Walker, Post-Charge Questioning of Suspects, CRIM L. REV.,
no. 7, 2008 at 509, 516–17. If structured in this fashion, the “intervention of the judge
would answer the demand for equality of questioning opportunities and would reduce
concerns about voluntariness and fairness.” Id. at 517. However, the ICTY Statute and
Rules do not provide for judicial involvement in this manner.
169. As noted by one commentator, this is true despite the fact that “the general prac-
tice in common law jurisdictions [is] that once an accused person has been arraigned, the
prosecutor is not allowed to question him. The contest is already set.” Ntanda Nsereko,
supra note 126, at 531.
170. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 63(A).
171. Id. at r. 63(B) (obligating the prosecutor to administer the warning required by
Rule 42(A)(iii), which informs the individual being questioned both of his or her right to
silence, and of the fact that all statements are recorded and can be used in court).
172. Id. at r. 63(A).
173. Id.
174. Id. at r. 63(B) (mandating compliance with the recording requirements contained
in Rule 43).
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properly treated following the issuance of an indictment. But whether
this objective warrants continuing to subject indicted individuals to
the full array of prosecutorial investigatory authority is a more debata-
ble matter.
G. Discovery and Disclosure
As part of its overall procedural environment, the ICTY Rules in-
clude broad discovery and disclosure requirements. This reflects a
structure designed to minimize trial surprises and improve the effi-
ciency of the trial process. As such, the broad discovery structure par-
allels the discovery and disclosure systems common in the United
States. However, while the imposition of a prosecutorial duty to turn
over evidence to the defense is a straightforward policy judgment,
right to silence issues are raised when a similar duty is imposed on the
accused.
Depending on the evidence and the inferences that defense dis-
closure generates, the ultimate result can amount to pressure on the
accused that is inconsistent with the Article 21(g) right “not to be
compelled to testify against [oneself] or to confess guilt.”175 This con-
cern can arise where the disclosure sought from the accused is for
documents in his or her possession that may later serve to bolster the
prosecution’s case, or where the prosecutor seeks physically identify-
ing samples from the defendant such as blood, handwriting or DNA
samples, or psychological or psychiatric examinations designed to
evaluate the defendant’s mental capacity.
Rule 66 establishes the ICTY’s system of broad prosecutorial dis-
closure, including the obligation to provide witness statements to the
defense as well as to allow it to inspect a wide range of items that are
“material to the preparation of the defence, or are intended for use by
the prosecutor as evidence at trial or were obtained from or belonged
to the accused.”176 This duty is supplemented by an independent
prosecutorial obligation to disclose material within the prosecutor’s
knowledge that “may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of
the accused or affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence.”177
However, the ICTY Rules also impose significant disclosure obli-
gations on the defendant. The duty extends to providing the prosecu-
tor with documents and various tangible objects “which are intended
175. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 21(4)(g).
176. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 66(B).
177. Id. at r. 68(i).
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for use by the Defence as evidence at trial,”178 as well as statements of
witnesses the defense intends to call to testify at trial.179 There is, how-
ever, a timing differential with respect to the obligation to disclose
witness lists during pretrial proceedings. This duty is part of the prose-
cutor’s responsibility during pretrial proceedings,180 but it does not
become a defense duty until “[a]fter the close of the Prosecutor’s case
and before the commencement of the defence case . . . .”181 This
would serve to prevent the prosecution from using information from a
defense witness to help establish its case-in-chief. However, it is also
true that after the conclusion of the examination-in-chief of a prosecu-
tion witness, the defense must turn over any documents it intends to
use in cross-examining that witness, despite the fact that those docu-
ments may later be used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief. Rather
than viewing this as an instance of compelled self-incrimination, one
ICTY Trial Chamber ruling saw it as simply a possible negative conse-
quence of the defendant’s decision to use a particular document.182
In one ICTY preceding, the prosecutor sought earlier disclosure
of defense witness lists, relying upon the ICTY Rules.183 The ICTY
Trial Chamber rejected this effort, noting that “[t]he general provi-
sions of Rule 54 may not be used to circumvent the specific require-
178. Id. at r. 67(A)(i). In contrast, an earlier version of the Rule did not require the
defense “to make any disclosure whatever, unless it intends to rely on an alibi defence or
any special defence,” although reciprocal disclosure was required if the defense sought
disclosure from the prosecutor. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Sepa-
rate Opinion of Judge Stephen on Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness
Statements, 3 (Nov. 27, 1996). Interestingly, the Rules of the Rwanda Tribunal do not
create an independent defense duty to allow inspection of books, documents, photographs
or other items intended for use at trial. Instead, they provide that such access shall be
granted by the defense following a defense request for access to these items from the pros-
ecutor. See Int’l Crim. Trib. of Rwanda, R. Evid. & P., r. 67(C), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.18
(2010) [hereinafter ICTR Rules]. Presumably, the defense can avoid providing disclosure
to the prosecutor by not requesting disclosure from the prosecutor.
179. ICTR Rules, supra note 178, at r. 67(A)(ii). Also covered by the disclosure duty are
statements that may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony pursuant to ICTY Rules 92 bis, 92
ter, and 92 quater. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 92 bis, 92 ter, 92 quater.
180. Id. at r. 65 ter (E)(ii).
181. Id. at r. 65 ter (G); JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEVEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PRACTICE 658–659, §§ 8.5.349–8.5.352 (3d ed. 2003).
182. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Decision on Joint Defence Motion to
Prohibit Use of Defence Documents by the Prosecution, ¶ 10 (Dec. 5, 2008).
183. ICTY Rule 54 grants the court general authority to issue “such orders, summonses,
subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an investi-
gation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial.” ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 54.
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ments enunciated in [Rules 66 and 67].”184 However, the Trial
Chamber also noted that where defenses of alibi, diminished responsi-
bility or lack of responsibility are offered, the Rules specifically call for
timely witness list disclosure by the defense.185 In addition, asserting
an alibi defense obligates the defendant to provide sufficiently specific
notice of the details of where the defendant claims to have been and
any evidence the defendant intends to rely upon in support of his or
her alibi claim.186
Subject to Rules 66 and 67, work-product is not subject to disclo-
sure for either the defense or prosecution,187 and it is highly likely
that the protective umbrella will cover at least some self-incriminatory
items in the defense’s possession. Where that is not the case, broad
disclosure requirements can easily raise the risk that the defense will
be forced to grant the prosecutor access to items that will help to
prove the defendant’s guilt. Some of this risk arises during the pretrial
process when the defense is obligated to provide the prosecutor with a
witness list188 along with a list of exhibits the defense intends to of-
fer.189 The Rules restate these obligations as requirements prior to
trial, but significantly, at this point, the defense must also provide the
prosecutor with statements of witnesses the defense intends to call.190
Further self-incrimination risks may arise out of the accused’s
duty to notify the prosecution of his or her intent to rely on an alibi
defense or other special defenses such as diminished capacity or lack
of mental responsibility. The required disclosure in such instances in-
184. Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-91-21-PT, Decision on the Applications Filed by
the Defence for the Accused Zenjnil Delalic´ and Esad Lanzˇo on 14 February 1997 and 18
February 1997 Respectively, ¶ 9 (Feb. 21, 1997).
185. Id. ¶ 10. This obligation is contained in ICTY 67(B)(i)(a) and (b). ICTY Rules,
supra note 76, at r. 67(B)(i)(a)–(b). The provision of such notice obligates the prosecutor
to provide the defense with the names of rebuttal witnesses the prosecutor intends to call.
Id. at r. 67 B(ii).
186. Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for
Order Requiring Particulars of Accused’s Alibi Defence, ¶¶ 14–16 (Dec. 1 2010).
187. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 70(A). Work product is defined therein to include
“reports, memoranda, or other internal documents prepared by a party, its assistants or
representatives in connection with the investigation or preparation of the case.” Id. One
Trial Chamber Order concluded that a war diary and military log—detailed evidence that
was relied upon by the witness and necessary for his testimony—must be produced for the
prosecutor in the interest of justice. Prosecutor v. Blas˘kic´, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Order for
the Production of Documents Used to Prepare for Testimony, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 22, 1999). That order also held that such documents are not cov-
ered by the work product exemption from disclosure requirements. Id.
188. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 65 ter (G)(i).
189. Id. at r. 65 ter (G)(ii).
190. Id. at r. 67 (A)(ii).
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cludes details and witnesses in support of the alibi, as well as witnesses
and evidence to be offered in support of the special defense,191 follow-
ing which the prosecutor must provide the defense with its list of in-
tended rebuttal witnesses.192 The Rules specify, in addition, that while
sanctions may be applied pursuant to Rule 68 bis for an accused’s fail-
ure to comply with disclosure obligations, pursuant to Rule 67(C)
these may not include barring the accused from offering his own testi-
mony in support of the non-disclosed defense.193
Whether or not defense disclosure duties implicate the right to
silence depends upon how broadly that right is defined. This issue
arose in a Trial Chamber decision seeking to prohibit the use by the
prosecution of evidence supplied to it pursuant to the disclosure obli-
gations of the defense. In Prosecutor v. Gotovina,194 the Trial Chamber
ruled on a joint defense motion that sought to bar the prosecutor
from using such disclosed documents in its case-in-chief.195 The de-
fense saw this as a violation of the protection against self-incrimina-
tion, because it involved prosecution use of evidence whose disclosure
was compelled by a court ruling and thus was obtained against the will
of the accused.196 The court, however, did not view this as impermissi-
ble compulsion under the ICTY Statute, but rather as a procedural
consequence of the defense’s decision to use particular evidence as
part of its case, regardless of whether the prosecutor might later use
191. Id. at r. 67(B)(i)(a), 67(B)(i)(b). One Trial Chamber decision described the obli-
gation as “clear and unambiguous,” and noted that in such a case “it is not open to either
of the parties to challenge their duties . . . .” Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-91-21-T,
Decision on the Motion to Compel the Disclosure of the Addresses of the Witnesses, ¶ 11
(Jun.13, 1997). That case made it clear that the defense may request protective measures
in such cases, rather than seeking to avoid disclosure entirely. Id. ¶ 12.
192. ICTY Rules, supra note 76, at r. 67(B)(ii).
193. This was confirmed in a Trial Chamber decision that nevertheless allowed the
defense to present alibi witnesses, despite failing to provide their names to the prosecutor.
Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Decision on the Defence of Alibi for the
Accused Zoran Zˇignic´, 3 (Jul. 21, 2000). The defense in that case relied, in part, on the
authority contained in ICTY Rule 127(A)(i) to enlarge time limits, along with the prosecu-
tor’s representation that allowing the defense to go forward would not lead to any
prejudice. Id. at 2. In another proceeding, an ICTY Trial Chamber commented that, while
an accused has the right to offer his own alibi testimony, “if counsel does not file an appro-
priate alibi notice under Rule 67(A)(ii)(a) of the Rules, the evidence of other witnesses as
to alibi is liable to be excluded by the Trial Chamber.” Prosecutor v. Kupres˘kic´, Case No. IT-
95-16-T, Decision, Order Subsection (v) (Jan. 11, 1999) (emphasis added).
194. Case No. IT-06-90-T, Decision on Joint Defence Motion to Prohibit Use of De-
fence Documents by the Prosecution (Dec. 5, 2008).
195. Id. ¶ 2.
196. Id.
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the evidence in support of its own case.197 As such, the disclosure was
the result of the tactical choice the defense made to use a particular
document to cross examine a prosecution witness, rather than com-
pulsion that required the defendant to “testify against himself or to
confess guilt.”198
The Gotovina proceeding demonstrates that defendants before
the ICTY are at least theoretically free to claim a right to silence in
response to their compliance with disclosure obligations. Perhaps
most often those obligations will not provide the prosecutor with po-
tentially incriminatory information. If so, the disclosure requirements
would not be inconsistent with protection of the right to silence. How-
ever, where disclosure requirements imposed on the defense could
aid the prosecutor in proving guilt, it can be argued that they reflect
compulsion that will result in self-incrimination. However, even the
somewhat broader language of the United States Constitution’s Fifth
Amendment has not been an obstacle to broad criminal discovery sys-
tems.199 Instead, these have been found permissible in part on the
theory that they simply reflect the disclosure of information that
would be disclosed at trial anyway,200 as well as on the grounds that
the discovery system itself does not involve impermissible compul-
sion.201 The ICTY system seems very much in line with this approach.
III. The Right to Silence in the ICC
The drafters of the International Criminal Court Statute and
Rules also confronted questions concerning the self-incrimination
rights of suspects and accused persons during and after investigation.
As was true of the ICTY Statute and Rules, the drafters of the ICC
197. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
198. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 21(4)(g).
199. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81–82 (1970) (authorizing pre-trial discovery re-
garding defendant’s alibi defense). However, “many states viewed Williams as an invitation
to expand prosecutorial discovery against criminal defendants—free from the limitations
of the Constitution.” Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial
Balance, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1577 (1986).
200. Williams, 399 U.S. at 85 (rule requiring pretrial notice of an alibi defense “only
compelled petitioner to accelerate the timing of his disclosure,” and as such did not violate
the Fifth Amendment); see also Izazaga v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 304, 310–11 (Cal. 1991)
(discovery by the prosecution of names and addresses of witnesses the defendant intends
to call at trial permissible under the rationale of Williams).
201. In the context of upholding Florida’s alibi notice requirement, the Supreme
Court observed that “[h]owever ‘testimonial’ or ‘incriminating’ the alibi defense proves to
be, it cannot be considered ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.” Williams, 399 U.S. at 84.
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foundational documents gave prominent consideration to framing a
right to silence that would appropriately balance conflicting investiga-
tory and due process interests. Although the ICC solutions in many
respects parallel those of the ICTY, the language chosen is not always
the same and in some settings self-incrimination rights are clearly
different.
Article 55 of the ICC Statute identifies individual rights during an
investigation.202 With respect to investigations of covered offenses, the
article states that a person “[s]hall not be compelled to incriminate
himself or herself or to confess guilt.”203 Arguably, the language is
broader than the comparable provision of the ICTY Statute in that it
applies to all persons, not merely those who have been accused of a
covered offense pursuant to a confirmed indictment. Thus anyone,
regardless of the category he or she may be in, has the right to be free
of compelled self-incrimination during an ICC investigation as a result
of having the right “not be compelled to incriminate himself or her-
self or to confess guilt” during an investigation.204 In contrast, Article
21(4)(g) self-incrimination protection focuses on trial proceedings,
creating a right “not to be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt.”205 To the extent that the ICTY Statute’s Article 21 state-
ment of rights suggests a setting limited to giving testimony before a
court during the post-indictment process, the ICC Statute is again
broader, as it extends coverage to all forms of compelled self-incrimi-
nation, including those preceding the issuance of a confirmed
indictment.206
Additional rights related to protection of the right to silence are
granted by the ICC statute for situations where “there are grounds to
believe that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of
202. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 55. One ICC Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that the
investigatory rights protected by the ICC Statute are applicable to the preliminary phase of
ICC Court proceedings in which a ‘situation’ is being investigated, and there is no focus on
any defendant. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04,
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Chamber’s Decision of
17 January 2006 on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS
2. VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, ¶¶ 35–36 (Mar. 31, 2006). This is consistent with
the observation that “it would be inconceivable if the Court were to say that [investigatory
rights] were not applicable to investigators conducting preliminary examinations with a
view to determining whether to open an investigation.” Triffterer, supra note 61, at 1093.
203. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 55(1)(a).
204. Id.
205. See ICTY Statute, supra note 10, at art. 21(4)(g) (emphasis added).
206. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 55
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the Court and that person is about to be questioned.”207 This refer-
ence is narrower than the general category of persons, and appears
instead to be focused on suspects who have not yet been formally
charged. Suspects’ rights prior to questioning include the right to be
informed that there are grounds to believe they have committed a
covered crime,208 and that they are entitled to the assistance of coun-
sel, including free counsel “where the interests of justice so re-
quire.”209 Questioning is also limited to circumstances where counsel
is present, unless the individual has voluntarily waived that right.210
But whether or not counsel is present, the suspect has the central
right to remain silent “without such silence being a consideration in
the determination of quilt [sic] or innocence.”211
The rights of the accused in connection with determination of
any charge before the ICC are addressed in Article 67 of the ICC Stat-
ute. Since this is the point when the formal process has focused on a
particular individual, and with charges filed and adjudicatory proceed-
ings underway, more substantial protections are to be expected. These
protections are found in the Article 67 language identifying the ac-
cused’s self-incrimination protection as encompassing the right “not
to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent,
without such silence being a consideration in the determination of
guilt or innocence.”212
Once again, the drafters of the ICC Statute chose to deal with an
issue left untouched in the ICTY’s authorizing legislation. Indeed,
whereas both the ICTY Statute and Rules avoided stating what conse-
quences might follow from the decision to remain silent, the ICC Stat-
ute directly addresses that issue. It prohibits using silence in the
determination of guilt or innocence both where there are reasonable
grounds to believe the individual has committed a covered offense,213
and where the individual has been charged and therefore has become
an accused.214 Interestingly, however, individuals who are not yet for-
207. Id. at art. 55(2). The questioning may be performed by the prosecutor or by na-
tional authorities where a request has been made for their assistance under Part 9 of the
ICC Statute (International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance). Id. at arts. 86–102.
208. Id. at art. 55(2)(a).
209. Id. at art. 55(2)(c).
210. Id. at art. 55(2)(d). The right to be questioned in the presence of counsel only,
absent a waiver, has been viewed as “a significant advance in the protection of suspects over
previous international instruments . . . .” Triffterer, supra note 61, at 1103.
211. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 55(2)(b).
212. Id. at art. 67(1)(g).
213. Id. at art. 55(2)(b).
214. Id. at art. 67(1)(g).
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mally suspects or accused persons must look to the language of Article
55(1)(a) for right to silence protection. There, the ICC Statute also
identifies the right to be free of compulsion to self-incriminate or con-
fess guilt, but no mention is made of potential consequences if the
individual opts to remain silent.215
The ICC Statute’s approach, similar to that of the ICTY,216 per-
mits the accused to make “an unsworn oral or written statement in his
or her defence.”217 The proposal to permit this procedure surfaced in
preliminary discussions in 1996 and ultimately was adopted as part of
the statutory structure in the final Rome conference leading to the
adoption of the ICC Statute.218 Since taking an oath is not required,
perjury for intentional misstatements may not be charged. However,
while the ICC will not consider silence or the giving of an unsworn
statement as evidence of guilt, it is not clear whether the unsworn
statement itself can be considered evidence at all. At best it is likely to
be given less probative weight than sworn testimony, but at worst the
information revealed in the unsworn statement might not be viewed
as having any probative value.219
The ICC Statute also parallels the ICTY Statute and Rules in re-
quiring that those who are to be questioned must first be informed of
their rights, including the right to remain silent.220 Beyond applying
this requirement to interrogations conducted by the ICC prosecutors,
the ICC Statute specifically applies the duty to warn where question-
ing is undertaken by national authorities, pursuant to an official re-
quest from the ICC.221 Extensive requirements also exist under the
ICC Rules for the process of recording the interrogation session.222
However, if the individual questioned is a suspect, or the object of
either an arrest warrant or a summons to appear, the requirements
are somewhat more substantial.223
215. Id. at art. 55(1)(a).
216. Id.
217. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 67(1)(h).
218. Triffterer, supra note 61, at 1268.
219. See id. at 1269.
220. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 55(2).
221. Id. The rights identified in ICC Statute art. 55(2)(a)–(d), including the right to
silence contained in ICC Statute art. 55(2)(b), are applied to both national authorities and
the ICC prosecutor, pursuant to ICC Statute art. 55(2). Id. at art. 55(2).
222. ICC Rules, supra note 147, at r. 111.
223. Id. at r. 112. (applicable to suspects, because grounds exist to believe they have
committed an offense, or to those who are objects of either an arrest warrant or a sum-
mons to appear).
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One of the realities when investigating human rights atrocities is
that individuals from whom information is sought may not be readily
identifiable as suspects. For purposes of the ICC Statute, they must
first be considered “persons” under Article 55 and, as such, retain the
right to be free of compulsion to incriminate themselves, or to confess
guilt.224 As an investigation proceeds, whatever information the indi-
vidual possesses may prove relevant in the prosecution of one or more
ICC defendants, and nothing in the ICC Statute would prevent the
prosecutor from seeking to have the individual testify as a witness.
Though the ICTY Statute and Rules did not address the self-incrimina-
tion rights of individuals in this situation, the ICC Rules do.225
Pursuant to Rule 74, ICC procedure specifically recognizes the
self-incrimination rights of anyone called as a witness in an ICC mat-
ter.226 However, rather than providing for an absolute right to silence
comparable to the self-incrimination protection afforded defendants,
the ICC Rule allows the court to require that the witness answer the
self-incriminatory questions in return for a form of immunity, titled in
the Rules as an “assurance.”227 While the Rule suggests a conflict with
Article 55 of the ICC Statute, since it provides a mechanism for com-
pelling witness testimony that is not part of the Article 55 structure,
overriding the right to silence in return for a form of use immunity
has been viewed as an appropriate balance between the competing
enforcement needs of the ICC and the interest of the individual in
not being compelled to provide testimony against himself or
herself.228
Should the court deny the witness an assurance, the witness may
continue to refuse to answer potentially self-incriminating ques-
tions,229 whereas the granting of an assurance subjects the witness to
penalties if he or she fails to respond.230 However, the decision
224. ICC Statute, supra note 11, at art. 55(1)(a).
225. ICC Rules, supra note 147, at r. 74.
226. Id. at r. 74(3)(a) (“A witness may object to making any statement that might tend
to incriminate him or her.”).
227. Before providing assurances to a witness, Rule 74 directs the Chamber to seek the
views of the prosecutor, and to consider: (1) the importance of the anticipated evidence;
(2) whether the witness’ evidence would be unique; (3) the nature of the potential incrimi-
nation; and (4) the sufficiency of the protections available for the witness, in the particular
circumstances. Id. at r. 74(4), 75(5)(a)–(d).
228. See The Right of Non-Self-Incrimination of Witnesses Before the ICC, supra note 144, at
172–74.
229. ICC Rules, supra note 147, at r. 74(6). Pursuant to this rule, however, questioning
may proceed on other matters. Id.
230. See id. at r. 65(1). Rule 65(1) compels witnesses who appear before the court to
provide testimony, subject to Rules 73, 74, and 75. Id. By virtue of being granted an assur-
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whether to grant an assurance appears to be one that is committed to
the discretion of the Court,231 and it is uncertain whether the decision
to deny an assurance or compel a witness to answer a question would
be reversed on abuse of discretion grounds. Beyond that, it does not
appear that self-incriminatory answers can be compelled in return for
an assurance against prosecution in the context of prosecutor inter-
views as opposed to court appearances. Both Articles 93(2) and
57(3)(c) of the ICC Statute, along with ICC Rule 74(2), contemplate
an appearance before the court in The Hague. Therefore, assurances
against the use of responses to questions as part of an earlier investiga-
tion cannot be given.232
The substance of an assurance provides both privacy and self-in-
crimination protection. The privacy protection arises out of the re-
quirement that answers compelled from a witness who has been given
an assurance will be “kept confidential and will not be disclosed to the
public or any State.”233 The self-incrimination protection of the rule
stems from the fact that any statement the court requires the witness
to make after providing an assurance “[w]ill not be used either di-
rectly or indirectly against that person in any subsequent prosecution
by the Court,”234 except for offenses relating to the giving of false tes-
timony, conduct interfering with the administration of justice, or
where the witness deliberately refuses to comply with the court’s order
ance, the individual becomes a compellable witness with respect to the questions covered
by the assurance. Thereafter, failure to respond to question[s] subjects the individual to
penalties under Rule 171 for refusing to comply with a direction of the Court. Id.
231. Id. at r. 74(2).
232. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Second Decision on Ap-
plication by Nine Persons to be Questioned by the Office of the Prosecutor, ¶¶ 11–14 (Jan.
31, 2011) (noting that the “plain wording of [ICC Statute art. 93(2)] suggests that the
witness is required to appear before the court in The Hague,” and that because the appli-
cants’ testimony would be given in the Republic of Kenya, the provision was inapplicable).
Separately, the applicants relied on ICC Statute art. 57(3)(c) as grounds for an assurance
against prosecution prior to testifying. The court rejected that argument, responding that
the cited provision was designed to provide protection for the “physical or psychological
well-being” of the individual, not for protection against prosecution. Id. ¶ 14. The court
then looked to Article 55 of the ICC Statute, id. ¶ 16, which provides a person the right to
“not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt.” ICC Statute, supra
note 11, at art. 55(1)(a). By identifying this as the appropriate remedy for the applicants to
employ, the court implicitly recognized that witnesses who are not provided with an assur-
ance have the options available under that article to either refuse to answer incriminatory
questions, or risk that any statement made will be considered voluntary. Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Second Decision on Application by Nine Persons
to be Questioned by the Office of the Prosecutor, ¶¶ 11–14; see also The Right of Non-Self-
Incrimination of Witnesses Before the ICC, supra note 144, at 157–58.
233. ICC Rules, supra note 147, at r. 74(3)(c)(i).
234. Id. at r. 74(3)(c)(ii).
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or otherwise engages in conduct disrupting court proceedings.235
However, how far non-use protection extends beyond the introduc-
tion at trial of the compelled statement itself is not entirely clear, al-
though it has been argued that the fact that the assurance covers both
direct and indirect use of the compelled evidence should result in a
rule similar to the American fruit of the poisonous tree standard.236
Significantly, however, the immunity authority available to the
court is limited to its own proceedings. It does not include a legally
protectable interest against prosecution by a national government237
and, as such, has parallels to the approach of the United States Su-
preme Court.238 Therefore, for witnesses before the ICC, there is a
real risk that compelled testimony will in fact be used in a national
government prosecution where efforts to ensure the confidentiality of
the witness’ statement are unsuccessful. The drafters of the ICC Stat-
ute did not address this issue, even though the Statute’s signatories
could potentially have committed themselves to respect ICC assur-
ances of both the confidentially and non-use of compelled
statements.239
Although not a self-incrimination issue per se, the ICC rules
broaden protection against compelled incrimination by allowing cer-
tain individuals to claim the right to silence when questions asked of
them as a witness would potentially incriminate an accused person.240
This right is given to anyone who is a spouse, child or parent of the
accused, although the individual is free to answer questions if he or
she so chooses.241 Unlike the spousal and other privileges in American
235. Id. The exceptions provided for in ICC Rule 74(3)(c)(ii) refer to two provisions of
the ICC Statute: Article 70, listing “Offenses against the administration of Justice,” and
Article 71, describing “Sanctions for misconduct before the Court.” ICC Statute, supra note
11, at art. 70–71.
236. The Right of Non-Self-Incrimination of Witnesses Before the ICC, supra note 144, at
176–77. Arguably, the consequences of compelling testimony through the grant of an as-
surance will have been considered by the court before any assurance is granted. Therefore
the broader view, that an assurance should be interpreted to include derivative evidence,
represents the proper interpretation of ICC use immunity.
237. Id. at 175.
238. Balsys v. United States, 524 U.S. 666, 672–74 (1998) (refusing to recognize the risk
of foreign prosecution as a valid basis for a domestic self-incrimination privilege claim). In
the United States, Balsys implicitly limits the privilege against self-incrimination to the juris-
diction seeking to compel testimony. Therefore, United States courts may compel testi-
mony if the risk of prosecution is limited to a foreign jurisdiction and would not be bound
by a foreign immunity grant, unless an international treaty directs otherwise.
239. The Right of Non-Self-Incrimination of Witnesses Before the ICC, supra note 144, at
174–75.
240. ICC Rules, supra note 147, at r. 75(1).
241. Id.
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law, the ICC provision gives control over the decision to answer to the
witness, rather than the individual who could be incriminated by the
statement.242 Significantly, when evaluating a witness’ testimony, the
ICC Chamber may weigh the individual’s refusal to answer when the
question prompting an objection was asked for the purpose of contra-
dicting a previous statement of the witness, or where the witness was
selective in choosing what questions to answer.243
Finally, the ICC structure includes broad prosecutorial discovery
and disclosure responsibilities that largely parallel the procedures of
the ICTY. With certain restrictions, the ICC prosecutor must provide
the defense with a list of witnesses he or she intends to call, as well as
those witnesses’ prior statements,244 and must allow the defense to in-
spect any books, documents, photographs or other objects that are
“material to the preparation of the defence or are intended for use by
the Prosecutor as evidence . . . or were obtained from or belonged to
the person.”245 These duties reflect the policy consideration that the
fairness and evenhandedness of the trial process, and the avoidance of
the defense being placed at a substantial disadvantage in trial prepara-
tion, will be promoted if the prosecutor is subject to a duty to disclose
both incriminating and exonerating evidence.246
In a similar fashion, the defense has the reciprocal duty to allow
the prosecutor to inspect items in its possession that are intended for
use as evidence.247 But significantly, the ICC Rules as written do not
provide for a general defense duty to disclose its witness list or any
witness statements in its possession.248 Presumably, items that the de-
fense intends to introduce at trial would involve exculpatory evidence
that would not raise a risk of self-incrimination. However, because wit-
ness statements in the possession of the defense are testimonial in
242. Id.
243. Id. at r. 75(2).
244. Id. at r. 76(1).
245. Id. at r. 77.
246. Sabine Swaboda, The ICC Disclosure Regime – A Defence Perspective, 19 CRIM. L.F. 449,
450–51 (2008). The broad disclosure obligations created by ICC Rules 77 and 78 are lim-
ited where the prosecutor has “documents or information . . . obtain[ed] on the condition
of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence . . . .” ICC Statute,
supra note 11, at art. 54(3)(e). Pursuant to ICC Rule 82, such items may not be disclosed
without the prior consent of the provider. ICC Rules, supra note 147, at r. 82(1). In such
cases, the considerations supporting disclosure are offset by the risk that information-prov-
iders would not provide the prosecutor with evidence. See Anoushirvani, supra note 18, at
218–21.
247. ICC Rules, supra note 147, at r. 78.
248. Id. at r. 79. The Rules do, however, provide for particular instances requiring dis-
closure by the defense. Id.
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character, they are more likely to raise the risk that incriminatory in-
ferences advantaging the prosecution could be drawn. Beyond that,
the simple act of identifying the witnesses would permit the prosecu-
tion to conduct interviews that could bolster the prosecution’s case,
rather than merely aid in cross-examining the defense’s witnesses. By
not providing the prosecution with a general right of access to defense
witness lists and witness statements, the ICC rules provide greater pro-
tection from self-incrimination than is found in the ICTY system.
Nevertheless, the ICC has shown itself willing to order disclosure
by the defense where the material sought would relate to the identifi-
cation of “defences the accused intends to rely on and any substantive
factual or legal issues that he intends to raise.”249 One ICC Trial
Chamber rejected the argument that such disclosure would infringe
the defendant’s right to silence, since disclosure is only be required “if
the accused decides to advance a positive case (thereby waiving the
right to silence).”250 The dissenting opinion of Judge Rene´
Blattmann, however, clearly exposed the fundamental flaw in the ma-
jority’s reasoning, noting:
[A]n accused person’s right to silence is fundamental and it can-
not be considered that an accused person has only two options;
either to sit in silence throughout the entirety of the proceedings
without advancing any sort of defence, or to waive their right to
silence. This would be extremely disadvantageous to an accused
person and could hardly be considered a fundamental protection
to the accused.251
Separately, and consistent with disclosure requirements generally
applicable in the United States252 as well as at the ICTY,253 where the
defense relies on an alibi, or on grounds that would exclude criminal
responsibility under the ICC Statute, the ICC Rules require the disclo-
sure of witnesses to be offered in support of the defense.254 This will
enable the prosecution to be prepared to rebut the defense once
those witnesses are offered at trial. However, even if the defense does
not comply with the disclosure requirement, it may still raise the de-
fense and present supporting evidence.255 It is likely, though, that the
249. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Defence Request for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Disclosure by the Defence, § I(2)(b)
(May 8, 2008).
250. Id. § III(B)(13).
251. Id. § I(12) (Blattmann, J., dissenting).
252. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 216–51 and accompanying text.
254. ICC Rules, supra note 147, at r. 79(1).
255. Id. at r. 79(3).
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credibility of the defense would be undermined unless the non-disclo-
sure was justified. Significantly, the defendant’s witness list disclosure
duty does not include an obligation to turn over witness statements in
the possession of the defense.256 Thus, any self-incriminatory refer-
ences that might be contained in such statements cannot be used by
the prosecution to bolster its case-in-chief.
Conclusion
The International Criminal Court and the International Criminal
Tribunals that have been established in The Hague are unique judi-
cial institutions. They function as civilian trial courts that have been
given international jurisdiction to deal with war crimes and crimes
against humanity by their enabling statutes, and as such, they can
trace their roots to the tribunals that were created after World War II
to try German and Japanese war criminals.257 Significantly, however,
broad international consensus lies behind their formation. The ICTY
was created by United Nations action258 while the ICC was the result
of a treaty that has been signed by 120 independent nations as of this
date.259 This is not a setting in which the tribunals can be accused of
imposing victors’ justice on the vanquished.
At the same time, however, the broad international participation
in the formation of The Hague international criminal courts compli-
cated the process of formulating a structure and set of governing prin-
ciples that would define how those courts would function. Participants
in the formation of both the ICTY and the ICC included representa-
tives of both civil and common law systems.260 As a result, there were
differing views on the role judges should play in the investigatory and
adjudicatory processes. Additionally, the drafters of the ICTY and ICC
statutes had to balance the overall objective of bringing those respon-
sible for human rights atrocities to justice with general notions of pro-
cedural due process. Justice in this context could not be defined
exclusively by convictions, but rather had to include both the reality
and appearance of fairness. The handling of the right to silence by
The Hague international criminal courts illustrates how the process of
accommodating so many conflicting interests was able to protect the
256. Id. at r. 79(1).
257. See supra Part I.
258. See supra note 10.
259. See supra note 11.
260. See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text.
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values underlying an important international human rights standard,
while still achieving the courts’ important objectives.
In many respects, however, the development of the right to si-
lence by The Hague international criminal courts has been an evolv-
ing process. For example, the ICTY Statute did not originally directly
provide for self-incrimination protection during the investigatory in-
terviews performed before an individual had become an “accused.”261
Subsequently, this gap was remedied by explicitly including a ban
against compelling suspects to testify against themselves during inter-
rogations in the ICTY Rules.262 Similarly, the ICTY courts, through
case development, barred adverse use of silence against an individual
who had properly invoked his or her right against self-incrimination,
even though this issue had not been addressed in any of the ICTY
foundation documents.263
Nevertheless, the end result for both the ICTY and the ICC are
systems that are strongly protective of right to silence interests. Sus-
pects, accused persons, and defendants have the right not to testify
against themselves without their silence being used against them, and
have even been held free from compulsion to provide non-testimonial
identifying evidence. Moreover, unlike American law, The Hague
criminal courts may not supplant the right to silence through an im-
munity grant unless the individual in question is a witness.264 On the
other hand, post-accusation questioning of individuals who have been
indicted is permitted, albeit subject to protections that include warn-
ings of the right to silence and right to the presence of counsel, along
with the right to have the questioning session recorded.265
While the ICTY is approaching its final stages, the ICC is envi-
sioned as a court with a continuing responsibility to prosecute human
rights atrocities within its jurisdiction. Based on how the courts have
functioned thus far, there is no reason to doubt that the ICTY in the
cases it has yet to decide, and the ICC in future matters, will continue
to respect the right to remain silent as an important defense interest.
Each court has proven that the goal of bringing those responsible for
violating international human rights to justice is not inconsistent with
the protection of the international human rights of the defendants in
those proceedings.
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